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Preface 
This report is based on in-depth interviews with 20 of the leading opposition 
politicians in Azerbaijan. We have acquired good insight into the role of the oil 
industry in the country, or, more precisely, the Azerbaijani elite’s perception of 
the oil industry in the country. Some people may react to allegations about the 
oil industry that seem unfair or even downright untrue. True or untrue – the oil 
industry would do well to listen to what is said, because perceptions are also 
facts, being part of the Azerbaijani reality to which the oil industry must relate. 
Our data uncover a growing unease in Azerbaijan, a fear that the expected oil 
wealth be squandered by the narrow and corrupt power elite that is now on top 
and steadily entrenching itself further. Precedents from other oil states are frigh-
tening. 
The topic of the report is the development of democratisation and human 
rights, but since these virtues are inversely correlated with corruption, it is 
natural to raise the corruption issue too. The Western oil industry’s attitude to 
this serious phenomenon is therefore a key topic. The report shows how easy it 
is – almost without being aware of it – to be caught up in the paralysing culture 
of corruption and finally become part of it. There are attempts to relativise the 
phenomenon in terms of Azerbaijani history, to see it as normal and natural; but 
it is also sharply condemned. 
There is little doubt that the only hope of eradicating the culture of corruption 
lies in strengthening civil society and democracy. It is therefore encouraging to 
note that there is a very active political opposition advocating precisely this. 
That members of the national assembly and political parties are prepared to criti-
cise openly and work systematically for democratic development – in the full 
knowledge that this may lead to reprisals against both themselves and their 
families – is a new phenomenon in Azerbaijani society.  
It is a major challenge to the oil industry to stimulate the forces opposing 
autocracy and the culture of corruption. Passive behaviour will undeniably land 
them in ethical dilemmas, they will risk becoming indirect supporters of a power 
elite that has neither the power nor the will to stewardship of ‘the people’s gold’, 
Azerbaijani oil. 
I would like to thank Director Willy H. Olsen of Statoil, who has given me 
good advice and feedback throughout the project. My thanks also to Dr Raoul 
Motika of the University of Heidelberg for mobilising the necessary support 
apparatus for my Baku fieldwork. I received useful feedback at seminars at the 
Research Council of Norway (led by PETROPOL), at the Ministry of Oil and 
Energy and at the Foreign Ministry. Above all, special thanks to Hikmet Hadjy-
zadeh, previously deputy prime minister of Azerbaijan and ambassador to 
Moscow. My warm feelings for the Azerbaijani people and their struggle for 
justice, dignity and democracy are due first and foremost to him; at our almost 
daily meetings at the cafés along the Caspian waterfront, in the season the Azer-
baijanis call ‘the golden autumn’, he poured out his knowledge of and insight 
into Azerbaijani politics. This in itself justified the entire trip. Hikmet Hadjy-
zadeh’s role as door-opener to the big names of the political opposition guaran-
teed the success of my study trip. In this context I would also like to mention the 
many helpful and generous Norwegians working for Statoil in Baku. And 
finally: my thanks to the Ministry of Oil and Energy and PETROPOL in the 
Research Council of Norway, whose financial support made the project possible. 
 
Daniel Heradstveit 

Part I 
   
Descriptive Analysis

Chapter 1 
 
The Tug of War between Dictator- 
ship and Democracy in Azerbaijan   
This report aims to illuminate the struggle for democracy and human rights in 
Azerbaijan. On the basis of the idea that a key criterion for whether a country is 
democratic or not is how the rulers treat the opposition, we are narrowing the 
scope of the data in the analysis by building primarily on the perspective of the 
political opposition in the country. The problem set is also narrowed by our 
focus on the roles played by Western oil companies in the struggle for demo-
cracy and human rights. In order to give the reader some background to the ana-
lysis, however, our first chapter will endeavour to survey the entire field as it 
appears in Azerbaijan, and in this work we will build on secondary sources. 
In most of the states of the Caucasus and Central Asia the holders of power 
are Communists from the Soviet period. The current president of Azerbaijan, 
Heidar Aliev, is no exception. Former First Secretary of the Azerbaijani Com-
munist Party, subsequently a KGB general in the same country and finally a 
member of the Politburo of the CPSU – there are few who can boast of a more 
impressive record in the service of Communism in the Caucasus than Heidar 
Aliev. Some of these old Communists claim to be converts to Western values, 
others make no attempt to hide their Russian apprenticeship. The Azerbaijani 
president qualifies for the label of autocrat, but in view of his rhetorical homage 
to Western values such as civil society, the rule of law and respect for human 
rights, we may call him ‘Autocrat Lite’. The political institutions that prevent the 
president from amassing excessive power are weak, but have a potential for 
development. 
The Constitution 
The Azerbaijani constitution is based on democratic ideals; it aims at a democra-
tic secular state and upholds the rights of the individual. Citizens shall not be 
subject to arbitrary abuse of power. Great power is vested in the presidency, at 
the same time as the principle of separation of powers is included. All this, how-
ever, is on paper, in practice the president behaves as if the country had no con-
stitution.  
The width of the gulf between the principles of government enshrined in the 
constitution and the actual practice of politics is due to the fact that the constitu-
tion contains imported ideas while the old way of thinking is alive and well in 
the ruling class. Azerbaijan adopts political documents based on Western values, 
values with which neither Azerbaijani politicians nor the ordinary citizen is 
familiar. Apart from the narrow elite mostly to be found in Baku, there is little 
comprehension of the ideas enshrined in the constitution; it all seems very 
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foreign. As long as the constitution lacks popular legitimacy, the government 
does not need to pay attention to it, nor will the rulers hesitate to override consti-
tutional rules. If the constitution is ever to be taken as seriously as in Western 
democracies, there must be a change of mentality, a change that must necessarily 
come slowly. This does not, however, mean that the formal document has no 
value at all. On the contrary, it can be used, and is being used, by both the 
domestic political opposition and external players, as a crowbar with which to 
lever the presidency. For the president himself, the content of the political docu-
ments can at any rate form an ideal to which to aspire.  
The President 
Due to the ongoing war with Armenia and its enclave Nagorno-Karabakh that 
began simultaneously with Azerbaijan’s independence from the Soviet Union, 
the first years of ‘freedom’ were particularly chaotic. President Ayaz Mutalibov, 
first elected in 1990, in two brief years was deposed, restored and finally 
removed. The removal happened in May 1992, when Abulfaz Elchibey took 
over. He was chairman of the Azerbaijani Popular Front, the political movement 
that had been the standard-bearer for independence from the Soviet Union. On 7 
June 1992 he won a solid majority in the presidential election. It quickly became 
apparent that there was a great gulf between his brilliant eloquence – he mobi-
lised the masses by playing the strings of their strong emotions about indepen-
dence – and his ability to govern. He was therefore easy meat for coup-makers. 
Less than a year passed before the revolt of General Huseynov, a reaction to the 
big Armenian offensive of 1993 that occupied large swathes of Azerbaijani terri-
tory, areas still under Armenian occupation. This great Armenian victory created 
internal chaos in Azerbaijan and something close to civil war. Another cones-
quence of the fighting was over one million internally displaced persons (IDPs), 
12% of the entire Azerbaijani population. In his dire need, Elchibey implored the 
aid of his political arch-rival, Heidar Aliev, who since 1990 had been developing 
a power base in Nakhichevan, the Azerbaijani enclave sandwiched between 
Armenia and Iran. This turned out to be a mistake, for Heidar Aliev had larger 
ambitions than Elchibey counted on. Aliev had not been long in Baku before he 
removed his political rivals – both President Elchibey and the rebellious General 
Huseynov. Although Aliev was brought to Baku by the Huseynov coup, he was 
formally elected president on 3 October 1993 with 98.3% of the votes – a result 
highly reminiscent of Communist election results.  
President Heidar Aliev has conducted a sensible policy to make Azerbaijan 
truly independent, and no other state in the region has to the same degree suc-
ceeded in emancipating itself from Russian colonialism. His politics are pragma-
tic, and he understands the necessity of taking account of the other powerful 
regional players, Russia and Iran. Furthermore, Aliev’s presidency has been 
characterised by a high degree of consensus and domestic cohesion: Azerbaijan 
has progressed from chaos to order. Together with the toning-down of conflicts 
with the neighbours, this is an important precondition for the development of 
democracy and human rights.  
On the one hand Aliev’s policies have laid a solid foundation for indepen-
dence and stability, which may well be a precondition for democracy. The strong 
ties to the West also reinforce democratic impulses. On the other hand, Aliev has 
strengthened his personal power in his term of office. Policy is announced and 
implemented by the president and a group of close associates. All in all, Aliev 
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has laid a foundation that may lead Azerbaijan in a democratic direction, while 
at the same time the strong personal power of the president may be an obstacle 
to democratic development. 
Legislation, Parties and Opposition 
In a democracy the legislature checks the power of the Executive and sets the 
agenda for the various ministries. In other words, the legislature is an important 
player in political life. In Azerbaijan this is not the case, as the power of the 
National Assembly is limited already in the constitution.  
The National Assembly is further weakened by the parties’ inability to 
cooperate. This phenomenon may be explained partly by the fact that the politi-
cal parties are not held together by any ideology, but are more or less the perso-
nal followings of powerful rivals who cannot stand the sight of one another. In 
other words, these are not political parties in the Western sense, but factions. 
However, even though the Azerbaijani parties are small and weak and have 
minimal influence, they constitute definitely a beginning, and may thus come to 
play an important role in the country’s attempt to build a democracy.  
A major criterion of the degree of democracy in a country is how the rulers 
treat the opposition. In Azerbaijan it is by no means unusual for leading opposi-
tion politicians to be subjected to arbitrary arrest and imprisonment and thus 
gradually to disappear from the political scene. These arrested oppositionals are 
mistreated in prison; indeed, the terrible conditions in Azerbaijani prisons are a 
breach of human rights in themselves. Not only individuals but also political 
parties are arbitrarily treated and risk being excluded from the political process. 
Political mobilisation against the rulers is put down by force; the rulers do not 
hesitate to use violence to disturb and even break up political meetings.  
That elections are held at all, gives grounds for hope. In Western countries, 
political elections with a high turnout and no cheating are regarded as a neces-
sary condition of democracy. We should, however, be aware that the act of 
voting may in other cultures have a quite different meaning. In the days when 
Azerbaijan was a part of the Soviet Union, elections were held regularly. That 
did not prevent all the important decisions being taken in Moscow, so that the 
elections had little impact on daily life. Azerbaijanis’ attitude to elections may 
be a hold-over from the Communist system, when people voted out of duty (or 
fear) but did not expect that the result would affect their own problems. Elec-
tions, therefore, are not a sufficient condition of democracy. A clean election 
makes a favourable impression on the West and can be cashed in terms of good-
will for the regime, but because of the different weights accorded elections in 
different political cultures, they are a grossly misleading tool for monitoring the 
progress of democratisation.  
When Aliev acts autocratically, this is not first and foremost because he is 
insensitive to his surroundings, it is rather because the bulk of the people see 
such a strong executive as the normal – or even worse, as the desirable – state of 
affairs. In countries with a political culture that does not understand democratic 
concepts, democracy will remain a fragile plant with shallow roots, however 
many democratic institutions exist on paper.  
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Public Debate and Freedom of Speech 
One of the most fundamental characteristics of a democracy is public debate 
about policy. In Azerbaijan, only a narrow elite takes part in any public debate. 
It would not be correct to claim that full freedom of speech obtains, for example, 
certain restrictions are imposed on what can be said and written about the 
government in general and the president in particular. When anyone goes to far, 
it can result in a banning of the publication. Investigative journalism that uncov-
ers corruption and economic criminality is not very popular either. If various 
unwritten laws are broken, economic sanctions are imposed. Newspapers are 
printed in state controlled printing shops, and this allows the government in vari-
ous ways to remove material they do not want published, for example by 
increasing the printing costs. Non-government publications with small circulati-
ons and exclusively distributed in the major cities are especially vulnerable. If 
the government cannot silence journalists and editors any other way, it is not 
averse to resorting to violence.  
In all the new Muslim states of the Caucasus and Central Asia, there is little 
tolerance for criticism of the head of state. This is due partly to the fact that the 
rulers are old Communists, but it can equally well be explained by the traditional 
pre-Communist political culture, where the cult of personality always was 
strong. Even so, in no other Muslim country in the region is there such a wide 
and critical public debate as in Azerbaijan. This may be attributed to the 
country’s rich intellectual life before Communism, to which Azerbaijan is now 
attempting to return. Azerbaijani political leaders are relatively open in their 
criticism of the government and raise issues such as economic management fail-
ures, unemployment and so forth, the sort of issues debated in Western political 
milieus too. 
It is important to note that censorship was abolished, at any rate formally, in 
1998, and that the country is in the throes of a media reform. Azerbaijani news-
papers cover a wide spectrum of political views; progress is being made, at any 
rate as regards the most important medium, television. National TV is state-
owned and politically controlled. Even if the control becomes notoriously strict 
when elections approach, the trend is towards fair and balanced coverage. Inde-
pendent radio and TV stations are beginning to appear, even if this development 
is encountering official opposition. Some people even have access to satellite 
television and e-mail. The Internet is a powerful weapon in the hands of those 
struggling nationally and globally for human and individual rights. Despite cer-
tain obstacles, Azerbaijan has a relatively free and open forum for debate, which 
in the long run can raise democratic consciousness. A comprehensive and free 
exchange of opinions promotes critical thought, people learn to respect others’ 
views and positions. In other words, a form of debate is under way that can help 
to transform the mentality of the political stratum in an autocratic state.  
Human Rights 
If the rule of law is to function as intended, the courts must be independent and 
the letter of the law respected. If this is not the case, violators of human rights 
will go unpunished, which is exactly what is happening in the oil states. The 
majority of the judges in Azerbaijan’s Constitutional Court have been appointed 
by alive and are naturally enough absolutely loyal to the powers that be. Besides, 
they often take bribes. In other words, the judiciary is neither free nor committed 
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to the rule of law. Those with power are still treating their ‘subjects’ arbitrarily, 
and the most elementary civil rights are ignored. 
That the content of political institutions has not yet penetrated popular con-
sciousness is clearly demonstrated in the question of respect for human rights. 
Azerbaijan has signed the relevant international documents, but has not imple-
mented them. The regime is continually violating human rights, and the costs of 
conducting such a policy are currently too small. Almost all those fighting for 
human rights in Azerbaijan belong to that part of the political elite which is in 
opposition to the regime – a narrow group, but well connected in the West, and 
able now and then to chivvy the Western and international community into reac-
tions for which Aliev most definitely has respect. In general the concepts of 
human rights have little popular root; for example, the Norwegian Refugee 
Council has held tuition programmes for the country’s displaced persons in pre-
cisely these fields, and it has found it very heavy going: human rights and demo-
cracy are foreign concepts that mean nothing to the refugees. The majority of the 
Azerbaijanis do not, therefore, react particularly to contraventions of human 
rights and democratic rules. If there is to be an end to arbitrary arrests and viola-
tion of the rights of the individual, it will be necessary to raise the consciousness 
of the broad masses of the Azerbaijani people.  
Heavy international pressure on the regime is another route, but a demanding 
one, often with little effect. On the one hand it is a definite plus for human rights 
that they are now monitored on a global level, as it makes it rather more difficult 
for regimes to indulge their taste for oppression without anyone noticing. Few 
countries avoid criticism, certainly not those around the Caspian Sea, which 
have all been scrutinised by serious NGOs such as Amnesty International and 
Human Rights Watch. On the other hand, the media tend to concentrate on the 
fates of individuals in emotional terms, rather than the legal system, which is 
much harder to understand but generally the underlying cause of the human tra-
gedies.  
The lack of respect for human rights in Azerbaijan raises ethical problems for 
investors in the country. International opinion, mediated by NGOs, will probably 
come increasingly to turn the spotlight on the country’s shady politics and the 
role of foreign investment. For example, an escalation of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict might cause massacres of Armenians (in the same way as massacres of 
Azerbaijanis in the last round), which could create an anti-Azerbaijani mood in 
the West. In such a situation, Western oil companies would be blamed for 
amorality and passivity vis-à-vis violation of human rights. Such an escalation 
would also set the stage for a more acute form of dictatorship. 
Civil Society 
In the wake of the Cold War, the West launched a global offensive to promote 
democracy. In addition to legal and constitutional reforms, it concentrated 
initially on democratic political institutions. It gradually became clear, however, 
that such institutions generally function poorly or not at all in most Muslim 
countries, because they lack support and legitimacy in the political milieu.  
What first comes to mind in association with the phrase ‘civil society’ is 
voluntary organisations. A well-developed civil society, that is, a society with a 
multiplicity of non-governmental institutions, is a precondition for a well-func-
tioning democracy. The voluntary organisations that compose the vanguard of 
civil society are meant to serve as ‘watchdogs’ and correct the rulers by creating 
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public debate on policy, turn the spotlight on abuse of power, promote human 
rights, propose conflict resolutions and generally communicate the interests of 
the citizens to the rulers, making it easier for politicians to work out compro-
mises.  
On paper, there are a great number of voluntary organisations in Azerbaijan – 
but only on paper. Closer examination shows that the organisations are not 
voluntary, but on the contrary controlled by the authorities. Organisations that 
are controlled by the state cannot act as a check on it, while Azerbaijani organi-
sations that are not subject to such control have no chance of being heard. In 
addition comes the fact that membership in these organisations is by and large 
confined to a narrow elite in Baku. There is no question of mobilisation of the 
‘grass roots’ like some of the well-functioning organisations in the West, the 
cornerstones of democracy. The regime wants particularly to control the volun-
tary organisations that are concerned with human rights, naturally enough 
because it is currently contravening them on a large scale. Working conditions 
are better for voluntary organisations involved in environmental protection. The 
reason why the authorities take a more liberal view of environmentalism may be 
found in history. Soviet collectivisation, monoculture and breakneck develop-
ment of heavy industry caused irreparable ecological damage. It is a common 
perception that the Soviet Union’s policies were an ecological catastrophe 
throughout the Caucasus and Central Asia. Many Azerbaijanis have good educa-
tion but no jobs: if the idealists among the unemployed can channel their energy 
through voluntary organisation work, they can create a new political activism 
that may counteract Azerbaijan’s personalising of power.  
Corruption 
All societies have networks based on kinship, profession, region or institutions 
in which people know one another and exchange services, but this is true to an 
even greater extent for traditional societies and those in transition to modernity. 
For an Azerbaijani, it is essential to belong to a network organised around pow-
erful individuals. These networks are an integral part of political life and consti-
tute a direct threat to the tender shoots of democracy. They represent no social 
group and sometimes have a very fluid organisational structure. Much of the rea-
son why the informal networks play such a great role is because the new states – 
and Azerbaijan is no exception – have failed to develop the efficient state appa-
ratus that is a precondition for democracy. 
It has turned out that the traditional networks have an astounding ability to 
survive in the ‘new’ society following the fall of the Soviet Union. They are not 
a carbon copy of the classical pre-modern clan system, but pop up in new forms. 
It is interesting to note that the Soviet Union made no attempt to replace the pre-
modern clan with modern thinking, preferring a divide-and-rule policy using the 
clan system as one of its instruments. There is much to suggest that the clan 
system has thus been enabled to survive and take its place in Azerbaijani society 
even after independence.  
Networks and corruption are so tightly interwoven that they can hardly be 
distinguished. What underlies corruption can vary from state to state. In Azer-
baijan, a contributory cause is the clan system. Corruption is relativized, that is, 
seen as normal and natural because it always was a part of Azerbaijani history. 
Another factor is a public sector dominated by the underpaid and underqualified. 
Apart from increasing the pay of government servants, therefore, clientelism and 
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‘pull’ must be cracked down on, and it is vital that appointments to state jobs be 
by real competition. Public servants must be protected against unfair dismissal. 
There must be an end to the same people working in both the private and the 
public sectors, and to arbitrary decisions.  
The norms of modern society in both the political and the economic areas 
counteract corruption. However, respect for and maintenance of these norms re-
quire institutions related to democracy and human rights. This is a Catch-22 situ-
ation: corruption cannot be combated without democracy, and democracy cannot 
thrive in the presence of corruption. In the same way, democratic institutions 
will have no popular legitimacy until they are seen to work, and they do not 
work because they have no legitimacy. Azerbaijan needs a sea change in its poli-
tical culture, and such transformations do not happen overnight. Moreover, even 
if they could, such drastic change, severing the bands of traditional society 
would lead to alienation and frustration and thus to violence and religious extre-
mism. What is needed is an amalgamation of traditional and modern values, 
which means primarily the incorporation of Islamic ethical values into a modern 
society.  
A major challenge to the oil industry is to stimulate forces that can counteract 
the clan system and corruption. Passivity will inevitably lead to their becoming 
props for a political elite that has neither the will nor the ability to act as stew-
ards of the ‘people’s gold’.  
The Economy 
To build up a partly ruined economy and achieve the necessary economic 
growth, Azerbaijan is dependent on foreign trade and foreign investment. Eco-
nomic growth can be created first and foremost by production of oil and gas. If 
Azerbaijan is to become a state whose petroleum resources are used for the good 
of country and people, it must avoid the traps into which other oil-rich states 
have fallen: for example, anticipating the oil revenues by taking up foreign loans 
that ultimately spiral out of control and require the entire economy to repay, or 
at worst lead to default.  
The corruption and kleptocracy that dominate many oil-rich states also lead 
to mistakes. Oil riches go to a leadership elite that lives in luxury, without the 
slightest respect for the rule of law, much less a social conscience. The result is 
often political instability and regression. Even if Azerbaijan’s situation in this 
respect is by no means unambiguous, the fact that the country is looking west-
wards and struggling to develop the institutional foundation of a modern rule of 
law gives reason to hope that it may learn to manage the oil and gas revenues in 
a sensible manner. 
The norms, ethics and habits of the globalised market economy have yet to 
take root in Azerbaijani society. If these norms are to be respected by both the 
rulers and the ruled, they must be promoted by strong institutions.  
New norms must be created for economic activity, and the state’s role in the 
economy must be reduced. When the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the World Bank get involved in countries like Azerbaijan, their recipe for getting 
the economy moving again is well-known: privatisation of state-owned compa-
nies. Tax revenues should not be used to subsidise unproductive enterprises, and 
no investment should be given to unviable projects. In addition, the income from 
assets must be increased, services must be made more efficient and there must 
be investment in new technology, but by private owners. Such a policy would be 
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a radical breach with the country’s former planned economy. The same applies 
to the demand for protection of private property and the enforcement of con-
tracts by law. The IMF approach to competition is to remove controls on wages, 
prices and investment. However, removal of control mechanisms generates a 
need for new ones. When the state no longer protects the interests of consumers 
and employees directly, they must be safeguarded in other ways, for example 
through regulation. When an economy is privatised, it is essential to prevent the 
mere replacement of public monopolies by private; excessive market power 
must be tamed. As regards the oil and gas industry in the Caspian Sea, the big 
issue for the oil industry is whether the regulatory apparatus should be separated 
from the Executive and the state-owned companies.  
It is a promising sign that Azerbaijan is trying to live up to the economic 
reforms demanded by the IMF in 1994 and 1996, and this is a signal that the 
country will adjust in other areas too. One of the preconditions for such a deve-
lopment is that Western states treat Azerbaijan fairly, which they are not doing 
at the moment. In its insatiable hunger for boycotts, the US Congress has inser-
ted a clause into the Freedom Support Act that mandates economic sanctions 
against Azerbaijan – although the clause was softened in October 1998. The leg-
islation was probably motivated not by the facts on the ground but by American 
sympathy with the Armenians over the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. American 
actions are a threat to the positive feelings towards the West that the current 
regime is attempting to inculcate into the Azerbaijani people, and which are 
essential to the success of democratisation. It has been seen that when the West 
takes sides in conflicts such as Nagorno-Karabakh, democracy and human rights 
are discredited and work for democracy is hampered. It is important that the 
West profile itself in a positive manner in Nagorno-Karabakh, because its 
actions there are interpreted in terms of what the West stands for in questions of 
democracy and human rights. The correct course would therefore be to play the 
role of an honest broker. The geopolitical consequences of any escalation of the 
conflict should make the West get involved, and this should happen now, when 
the region is relatively peaceful and stable. 
Azerbaijan’s future political stability is dependent on a fair and just 
apportionment of the oil and gas resources. We have seen how the power elite’s 
misappropriation of petroleum revenues has led to internal unrest and revolutio-
nary changes without resulting in improved social conditions. Radical changes 
in a society create conflicts between those who have acquired privileges and 
those who have not. Distribution policy becomes a struggle between the rich few 
and the rest of the population, who are relatively poor. Free flow of ideas and 
information aggravate the tensions between traditional and modern society, and 
the price of oil is also crucial. In 1997 there was macro-economic stability, but 
the dramatic fall of the oil price in 1998 caused pessimism to increase. 
Socio-economic tensions create political instability in oil-rich states. To what 
degree Azerbaijan will succeed in adapting itself to radical changes so that the 
country avoids permanent instability and chaos is dependant on whether the 
institutions have sufficient popular legitimacy to withstand the processes of 
change and thereby maintain a relative political stability. In this perspective the 
fall of the oil price in 1998 may have been useful, because it led to a soberer 
appraisal of what oil can contribute to in Azerbaijan. The notion of Azerbaijan 
as a future ‘rentier state’ took a knock, and it is now realised that the oil reve-
nues may be much smaller than first thought; there may be both less oil to pump 
and smaller revenues to earn on it. With such prospects, it will be in the interest 
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of the rulers to stimulate a sustainable development in which oil is important, but 
not the most important factor. When the oil revenues are of such a size that the 
regime can dish out welfare benefits to the population, it hampers the growth of 
democracy and institution-building, because the people become passive. In the 
opposite case, the rulers have to achieve popular legitimacy, and this increases 
the pressure for democracy and institution-building. 
Azerbaijan cannot expect to become a ‘rentier state’ like some of the oil emi-
rates in the Gulf. However, if Azerbaijan avoids the traps fallen into by other oil 
states, where the revenues are squandered by authoritarian and corrupt elites, the 
oil can help it to develop into a modern society connected to both the internatio-
nal economy and the community of democracies.  
Frontiers 
The strengthening of the Azerbaijani economy will help to make the country less 
dependent on neighbouring states such as Russia and Iran, countries that repre-
sent, or may come to represent, a threat to its independence. As a small and 
weak nation and with major internal problems, Azerbaijan cannot take its inde-
pendence for granted.  
One of the biggest challenges currently faced by the Caucasian republics is 
the question of their frontiers. The period since the fall of the Soviet Union has 
been dominated by irredentism. The Communist empire left behind it states with 
boundaries that had been drawn arbitrarily to suit Moscow’s interests. Moreover, 
in the Caucasus and Central Asia the imperial power was forever tinkering with 
the lines on the map, which thus had little or no popular legitimacy. It is, per-
haps, remarkable that the frontiers of the new republics have undergone so little 
change. On the other hand, even if the frontiers have not been formally changed, 
their arbitrariness has led to several bloodbaths, and there is imminent danger of 
more.  
The conflict between Azerbaijanis and Armenians over Nagorno-Karabakh 
can have major geopolitical consequences, and is a threat to Azerbaijani inde-
pendence. In 1992, the Armenians acquired control of the strategically important 
Lachin corridor between Nagorno-Karabakh and their capital Yerevan, and the 
following year the Karabakh Armenians conquered the entire enclave plus an 
area of equal size down to the Iranian border. Armenian-occupied territory now 
comprises 20% of pre-conflict Azerbaijan and means that Baku no longer con-
trols its own territory. Because the other side is the Armenians, we are facing a 
conflict in which the psychological barriers to peace can seem insuperable. Over 
the ages, Turkic-speaking Muslims have perpetrated massacres of Armenians, 
with casualties in the millions. According to Armenian nationalists, current 
struggle over Nagorno-Karabakh is only a continuation of this long struggle of 
the Christian Armenians against Turkic peoples. This is not, therefore, merely a 
conflict of national interests, a raison d’état; we must take account of the his-
toric traumas of the Armenian nation.  
The unresolved question of the allocation by international law of the resour-
ces of the Caspian Sea is not merely a question of economics, but also one of 
national security. In Soviet days the assertion was that it was unnecessary to 
draw delimitation lines in the Caspian Sea, because its resources belonged to the 
greater fatherland of which Azerbaijan was a constituent part. Today, Russia is 
advocating an equal distribution between the littoral states, while Azerbaijan 
wants clearly defined exclusive economic zones. It is generally the case that the 
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economic interests in production of oil and gas are so strong that interests of 
national security and geopolitics are set aside: drilling is undertaken even where 
the boundaries are unclear. As long as this question remains unresolved, how-
ever, they can be used to put pressure on Azerbaijan at any time, and thereby put 
obstacles on the road to independence and freedom.  
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the transport routes for oil and gas have 
become equally controversial, both commercially and geopolitically. A presenta-
tion of these complicated issues would take too much space, and we will content 
ourselves with mentioning that the pipelines from Azerbaijan currently run 
through both Russia and Georgia. The planned pipeline from Baku to Ceyhan on 
the south coast of Turkey has been a hot potato for many years. This is more 
geopolitics than business, as commercial considerations do not suggest such a 
solution, although it would strengthen Turkey’s regional position both politically 
and economically. Azerbaijan’s secular and Western orientation, and not least 
the deep sense of ethnic brotherhood with Turkey, make the latter a natural 
choice for the route, because it is there that Azerbaijan can find the maximum 
political and security benefit. The commercial benefit, on the other hand, would 
lie in transport through Iran, but given Azerbaijan’s complicated relationship 
with its southern neighbour and the visceral American hostility to Teheran, the 
politics of such a pipeline would be negative. However, this situation may be 
transformed by the ideological thaw presently under way in Iran.  
The unclarified questions of frontiers and transport routes are directly related 
to the Azerbaijani nation-building project and Azerbaijani independence.  
Ethnic Minorities and Azeri Irredentism 
In the former Soviet Union the respect and independence of ethnic groups were 
enshrined on paper, but in reality Moscow relied on a policy of divide and rule. 
After the collapse, the heritage of Soviet methods has lain as a dark shadow over 
Azerbaijan in the form of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the former autonom-
ous area that has generated unrest, coups, war, ethnic cleansing, refugee flows 
and the occupation of Azerbaijani territory. By granting an ethnic group within a 
republic autonomous status, Stalin laid the foundation for the present conflict. 
His policy towards different ethnic groups was to prevent one particular group 
from achieving excessive power. By favouring one group’s special character – 
or, to put it another way, by making the ethnic groups as unlike as possible, 
Stalin aimed to neutralise their power within the empire. In Azerbaijan, the 
Christian nature of the Armenians was emphasised in contrast to the Muslim 
nature of the Azeri population. This policy was the opposite of what we might 
call positive nation-building, that is, a policy in which all inhabitants of a state 
identify with a common national symbol. The upshot was a divided nation, with 
hostility between the Armenian and the Azeri populations.  
The reason why we take up Stalin’s policies is that they are of direct rele-
vance to the current Western debate on Nagorno-Karabakh. It may seem to the 
West an acceptable solution to give the Armenians living within Azerbaijan’s 
frontiers cultural and political autonomy, but the Armenians’ experience of what 
autonomy meant under Stalin – a tool of oppression – makes it understandable 
that they are sceptical of Azerbaijan’s offer of ‘full autonomy’. If the Armenians 
are to accept this, they must be given guarantees of international involvement 
and presence of the kind we now have in Kosovo. But the international com-
munity has not hitherto shown any willingness to commit itself to any such 
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policy, and it is unlikely that it ever will. As for Russia, its ever-closer involve-
ment in Azerbaijan derives from its wish to profit from ethnic tensions.  
Azerbaijan sees Russia and Iran as the main threat. This is due partly to the 
fact that Iran was the imperial power before Russia, and partly to the policy Iran 
has conducted vis-à-vis Azerbaijan since the fall of the Soviet Union. The religi-
ous aspect of Iranian policy will be mentioned in the next section, but there is an 
ethnic reason for the tension between the two states as well. Azerbaijan’s ethno-
nationalists, led by former President Abulfaz Elchibey, have the express aim of 
creating a Greater Azerbaijan by incorporating their kith and kin on the other 
side of the border. These people speak the same language – although it is 
oppressed in Iran. In fact, there are far more Azeris in Iran than in Azerbaijan 
itself. However, the Azerbaijanis are not being properly informed that, even 
though there is still a heavy concentration of Azeris in the north-west, with 
Tabriz as their capital, the Azeri element in Iran is now dispersed over the entire 
country. Moreover, ethnicity has quite a different content and meaning in the 
assimilationist Iranian state than in Azerbaijan, where the various variants of 
Turkicism have a strong position. Given the powerful political motives in Baku 
for emphasising the Azeri population in Iran, and Teheran’s equally powerful 
political interest in dismissing and oppressing ethno-nationalism, it is difficult 
for outside observers to form an accurate idea of the problem.  
Political Islam 
Not only has Iran been supporting the Armenians over Nagorno-Karabakh, it has 
also been attempting to export Islamism. The ayatollahs identified the refugee 
population in Azerbaijan as the primary target for their political message; it 
looked as if they might be fertile soil for the Iranian ideology. This missionary 
activity led to the Iranian clerics being kicked out of the country. Azerbaijani 
law now strictly prohibits the mixing of politics and religion, that is, political 
Islam. The only lawful political parties from now on will be those explicitly 
founded on secular ideologies. Even if Azerbaijan is in good Muslim company 
in this, the regime’s response is disquieting, for two reasons: the government is 
relying on an undemocratic prohibition at the same time as it is showing little 
interest in the question why political Islam might take root – the socio-economic 
conditions of the million or so refugees in the country. Another part of the 
picture is that the funds for refugee relief that might have served to counteract 
the castles in the air that the Islamists promise the miserable refugees, find their 
way instead into the pockets of corrupt officials. 
Experience from other oil states shows how important it is that the rulers take 
account of the unemployed, poor, marginalised and outcast. The target group for 
the Islamists and their false hopes is above all the population of the shanty towns 
around the big cities, many of whom are rural migrants unfamiliar with urban 
values and lifestyles. Pressure from the Islamist alternative to Azerbaijan’s pre-
sent secular and pro-Western orientation has recently been stepped up by succes-
ses in the Northern Caucasus, particularly Chechnya and Dagestan. This means 
that Azerbaijan is now flanked by Islamists on both sides, not just an eastern 
neighbour.  
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Conclusion 
Azerbaijan now functions as a nominal democracy, but the previous strong affi-
liation with Western ideals and the current pro-Western policy are reason for 
hope of a development towards real democracy. If this trend continues, there are 
good chances of democratic institutions and thinking becoming strong enough to 
neutralise the autocratic traditions and practices. Such a development would 
gradually improve the human rights situation and lay the basis for a steady 
improvement in the relations the country is now developing with the outside 
world. Democracy-building in Azerbaijan involves deep social and political 
change, and the Azerbaijanis therefore have a long way to go.  
Chapter 2 
  
Azerbaijani Perceptions of the  
Western Oil Industry. A Quantitative 
Summary of the Results 
Sample and Sampling Method 
The survey data are from fieldwork carried out in Azerbaijan in September-
October 1999. We conducted in-depth interviews with 20 members of the 
Azerbaijani political elite that presently belong to the country’s political opposi-
tion (see list of interviewees in Appendix II).  
Let us first make clear that the survey does not rest on a sample in the statisti-
cal sense. Political science knows no inter-subjective definition of ‘elite’ that is 
subject to any kind of consensus, and so the statistical universe cannot be 
defined as ‘members of the elite’. This means in turn that it is not possible to 
extract a representative sample in the statistical sense, and for our purposes that 
would not even be desirable. What we are interested in is political undercurrents, 
at present marginal but which, on the basis of comparative research in other 
countries, may become significant in the even that Azerbaijan takes the same 
road as other Muslim countries normally classified as oil states. The most obvi-
ous example is Islamism. For this reason our list of interviewees includes mem-
bers of the Islamist Party. Since the Azerbaijani constitution explicitly prohibits 
politico-religious parties, the Islamist Party is illegal, with some of its leaders in 
prison and others in hiding, and would never have appeared in any ‘representa-
tive sample’ of the political elite. 
An Arbitrary Selection 
We have made an arbitrary selection of political elites that represent policies and 
political ideologies in competition with the establishment, and which may 
become important for future political development. This is not a question of 
‘snapshots’ of political attitudes like in opinion polls; our selection of respon-
dents includes a dynamic aspect, that is, it tries to look forwards. 
The sample is restricted to the Azerbaijani political opposition. After advance 
consultation with experts, we drew up a list of 20 of the most important indi-
viduals in the political opposition. We obtained access to all 20, which is rather 
unusual in this kind of survey. Our list includes four of the five who are 
normally described as possible presidential candidates for the Azerbaijani oppo-
sition; we were unable to interview the fifth, Guliev, as he is presently living in 
the USA. In addition we have nine party chairmen, that is, chairmen of nine 
different parties. In this way the elite sample includes the most important oppo-
sition politicians and covers a wide spectrum of political opinions. 
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As we mentioned, the interviews are ‘in-depth’ ones and lasted on average 
1 ½ hour. A few questions had closed reply categories, but most were open. This 
methodology involves a time-consuming subsequent coding of the replies, but 
was necessary, as for obvious reasons we did not know the reply universe. The 
questionnaire was nevertheless standardised, that is, all the interviewees were 
asked exactly the same questions. 
Table 1 Party chairmen and presidential candidates in Azerbaijan, 1 September 
to 1 November 1999  
 
Party chairman Party Political flavour 
GAMBAR* Musavat Conservative/liberal 
ELCHIBEY* Popular Front Nationalist/Pan-Turkic 
KARIMOV* Popular Front Conservative/liberal 
DJABRAYIL-ZADEH Islamist Pro-Iranian 
ISMAILOV Democrats Diffuse populist 
ALIZADEH Social Democrats Pro-Russian and pro-Iranian 
KERIMLY Vahdat  Liberal, against Pan-Turkism 
MAMIDOV* Independence Market economics, Turkism 
HUSSEYNOV People’s Party Close to Social Democrats 
AXMEDOV Communists Reform Communists, pro-Russian 
* Party chairmen considered to be presidential candidates. Karimov is deputy chairman.  
NB! Most parties are personal followings and have no party structure in the Western sense.  
Limitation of the Data 
We have limited our survey to the political opposition in the country. What was 
said is therefore affected by political rhetoric. That is, we must assume that the 
statements reflect a political strategy designed to discredit the sitting government 
with a view to taking power oneself. The fact that we were foreigners helped to 
soften this aspect, because conversations with foreigners emphasis the informa-
tive at the expense of the agitation and demagogy that dominate the domestic 
power struggle. However, it can easily be that what is said in oral interviews 
fails to match the facts. Our survey makes no attempt to measure the ‘truth 
quotient’. On the contrary, our aim is to chart not facts but perceptions. These 
are perceptions of the Azerbaijani political scene that, even if they are based on 
myths, are just as relevant as those based on facts. We are constantly seeing how 
myth-making is a powerful rhetorical instrument in mobilisation for an alterna-
tive political order. In politics the important thing is not to be right, but to be 
believed. The oil industry must therefore deal with these descriptions, whether 
they are true or not, because they are relevant to its image in Azerbaijan. 
A major line of argumentation is that the oil industry is exclusively concer-
ned about money and for that reason does nothing to promote democracy and 
human rights. 
It is also claimed that the oil companies suffer from double standards: in their 
own countries they are for human rights, but in Azerbaijan they are indifferent. 
This creates the impression that the Azerbaijanis do not have the same human 
value as the inhabitants of the oil companies’ home countries.  
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Table 2 Western oil companies’ impact on democracy and human rights in 
Azerbaijan 
 
No impact  6 
Negative impact  0 
Positive impact 2 
Both positive and negative 2 
N = 20  
 
The respondents are also very concerned by what they see as discrimination in 
matters of pay. The assertion that Western oil companies discriminate against 
Azerbaijanis by paying them much lower wages than Western workers recurs 
with a high frequency.  
These three lines of argument are heard from those in the sample who con-
sider that the oil industry has no effect on work for human rights (30%) and 
those who maintain the attitudes and policies of the oil industry are a downright 
hindrance to work for democracy and human rights (50%). In other words, the 
majority are negative to the oil industry’s role in this area. In Azerbaijan, they 
say, the oil industry prefers dictatorship to democracy. It is a serious matter that 
so many think that the oil industry is not neutral, but, on the contrary, that its 
policies strengthen and uphold the dictatorship.  
It is pointed out that the opposition in the country is the side that feels most 
strongly affiliated to the West, but that there are signs that this sympathy may 
rapidly flip over to an anti-Western attitude. The argumentation is supported by 
the fact that the interviewees have the impression that Western oil companies 
seem to shun all cooperation with the opposition out of fear of reprisals from 
President Aliev. It is asserted that Western oil companies are refusing to employ 
Azerbaijani oil workers who have a problematic relationship with the regime.  
The opposition suspects Western oil companies of a political assessment of 
the country’s stability that makes them feel wellserved by a strong dictator and a 
weak opposition. It is added that sooner or later the opposition will come to 
power, and then the contracts of the oil companies which have been particularly 
supportive of Aliev will be in the danger zone. In fact, the companies which 
have gone furthest in propping up the dictatorship will be punished. It is claimed 
that the political parties in opposition have a file on each single oil company, in 
which they record everything it does in Azerbaijan. This being so, thinking only 
of money is dangerous short-termism for the oil companies, they say, for the 
chances of Azerbaijan one day having a government of present-day oppositio-
nals are great, and so in its own interests the industry should take a longer view.  
Among the 20% who think that the oil industry plays a positive role, or has 
an effect that is both positive and negative, the main argument is that the oil 
industry is the driving force behind the Western orientation Azerbaijan has 
chosen after the fall of the Soviet Union. Azerbaijanis enjoy close contact with 
democratic Western cultures in which human rights are a core element. That the 
Azerbaijanis can observe the Western standards of living they covet is an incen-
tive to strive for ethical ideals, for they perceive that human rights are respected 
in prosperous countries. Azerbaijani political culture therefore puts much greater 
emphasis on democratic ideals than would have been the case without any repre-
sentation of Western industry on the social scene. 
10% of the sample say straight out that the presence of the Western oil 
industry has improved the human rights situation. This statement is justified with 
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reference to the greater international familiarity with and attention to Azerbaijan, 
which makes it more difficult for the regime to tyrannise over the individual 
citizen. 
A More Detailed Presentation of the Central Arguments  
1. The oil industry is exclusively concerned with profit 
It is claimed that the oil industry is profit-motivated above all else, and that this 
goes a long way to explaining the fact that work for democracy and human 
rights is set aside when Western oil companies get involved in Azerbaijan. 
Western investors are, moreover, convinced that they need to stay on good terms 
with Aliev to do business. It seems that for that purpose dictatorship is unhesitat-
ingly accepted, and even supported. The prospects of being able to do good busi-
ness are the driving force behind Western interests, and the question whether 
Azerbaijan respects human rights or not is subordinate. The single-minded pur-
suit of profit makes Western businessmen shut their eyes to the violence the 
regime commits against its own citizens. Even when Western oil companies find 
it expedient to proclaim their support of democracy, this does not prevent it 
being a common perception among the Azerbaijanis that money is what it’s 
really all about. 
2. Western oil companies’ Janus visage – one standard at home, another in 
Azerbaijan 
The interviewees emphasise what they see as repulsive double standards: the oil 
companies come to Azerbaijan and push aside the democracy that they respect in 
the West. The high-minded rhetoric of the West about human rights in Soviet 
days is seen as an example of these double standards; for with hindsight, it can 
be seen as simply a tool for undermining Communism. Were the rhetoric more 
than that, then much more energy would be spent on promoting democracy in 
Azerbaijan. The impression is not improved by the fact that Western oil compa-
nies are paying court to a totalitarian regime in order to maximise their profits. 
That the forces in Azerbaijani society that have been most enthusiastic for 
human rights and affiliation to the West feel themselves betrayed by Western oil 
companies may easily lead to anti-Western attitudes.  
3. Equal pay for equal work 
Interviewees frequently complain about what they see as blatant discrimination 
against Azerbaijani labour. There are rumours of Western employees who get 
ten times the salary of Azerbaijani workers who do exactly the same jobs. The 
topic recurred in different variants and the conclusion is clear – Western egotism 
and discrimination are clearly expressed in the payment of Azerbaijani labour. 
Anyone who protests gets the sack. This behaviour is seen as a violation of 
human rights.  
Willingness to Make Distinctions 
Nevertheless, the interviewees did not judge everyone alike, they claimed to dis-
tinguish between nations and companies. A consistent feature was to distinguish 
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between the USA and Europe. The USA had displayed great enthusiasm for get-
ting Azerbaijanis to the US, giving them an education and schooling them in 
human rights. Irrespective of whether they were affiliated with oil companies, 
embassies or NGOs, Americans were regarded as much more active in human 
rights questions than the Europeans, their institutions and companies. The 
American Embassy is the only one to show any concern for violations of human 
rights; but where the State Department speaks out, the European foreign minis-
tries keep silence. On the other hand, it was mentioned that the German ambas-
sador was finally beginning to show some interest in human rights questions. 
The interviewees also distinguish between Western academic communities on 
the one hand and Western business and government institutions on the other. In 
general, academics – both European and American – exhibit a willingness to 
fight for human rights in Azerbaijan. 
The interviewees were willing to make distinctions, not only between Europe 
and the US, but also in the sense that some – not very many – also saw positive 
aspects to the Western involvement in the Azerbaijani oil sector. Among other 
things, it was admitted that Western oil companies could improve the prospects 
for human rights, because their very presence would strengthen Azerbaijan’s 
Western orientation. Azerbaijan’s obtaining ideological nutrition from expanded 
contacts with the West may in the long run strengthen human-rights awareness; 
knowledge of the ethical norms that obtain in Western societies whose inhabi-
tants live in freedom and prosperity may have the effect that Azerbaijanis will 
want to try to introduce the same norms. Close relations between Azerbaijan and 
the West may lead to the parties examining each other’s records, and this can 
strengthen the forces fighting for human rights. One interviewee even went so 
far as to claim that if it were not for the West’s supervision of Azerbaijan, he 
would be in prison right now. The interviewees concluded that even if the ethics 
of Western oil companies were not so good, their presence would have a positive 
effect because it is the oil above all that links Azerbaijan with the West. Respect 
for human rights in Azerbaijani culture would be most effectively promoted by 
ever-closer ties to the West. 
Azerbaijani Corruption and the Western Oil Companies 
The disappointment that interviewees feel over what they see as the cowardice 
of the Western oil companies is not lessened by the fact that Azerbaijan can 
boast of a democratic tradition that sets it apart from other Muslim states in the 
region. It was emphasised that Azerbaijan was the first country in the Muslim 
world to introduce democracy (the republic of 1918–20) and that the country 
was further ahead on the democratic road than Turkey. There can be no doubt 
today that Azerbaijan has advanced further in democratic thinking and develop-
ment than the other Muslim states in the region such as Kazakhstan, Turkmeni-
stan and Uzbekistan. For this reason the indifference of Western oil companies 
to the promotion of human rights in Azerbaijan is of particular gravity, for the 
country has shown that democracy and human rights ought to have good chances 
here.  
The main argument is that collaboration with a corrupt regime is itself cor-
rupting. As an illustration of this, frequent mention was made of the bonus 
money that the companies pay when contracts are signed. It was claimed that 
this money never appears in the accounts; in other words, it disappears, clearly 
into the dictator’s own pockets. In this context it is stressed that the oil compa-
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nies have no moral right to deny that they share responsibility. Aliev and the oil 
companies have acted in concert, and so both are guilty. It is interesting to note 
that the opposition is here asserting the same ethical principle as Transparency 
International: ‘The donor is as guilty as the recipient. They are in collusion.’ The 
argument about bonus money that corruptly disappears is the single assertion 
that recurs most often in discussions of corruption.  
It is a common perception that the Western oil industry is aggravating rather 
than ameliorating the culture of corruption, and that the danger of future oil 
revenues disappearing into the pockets of a corrupt clique is acute. It is worth 
noting that the interviewees are much more pessimistic about an improvement in 
the culture of corruption than about human rights and democracy. 80% blame 
the oil industry for the steadily increasing corruption. Only one single person in 
the sample thought that the Western oil industry was counteracting corruption, 
and even he made reservations, saying that the Western oil industry is serving 
the corruption culture by supporting the dictator Aliev. However, this respondent 
maintained that the Western oil industry was not itself corrupt; on the contrary, 
its business practice in Azerbaijan showed that it was possible to make money 
honestly, and so in the long run the oil industry will serve as an ideal.  
Table 3 Western oil companies’ effect on corruption in Azerbaijan 
 
No effect 3 
Increases corruption 16 
Decreases corruption 0 
Both increases and decreases corruption  1 
N= 20  
 
Many others in the sample were also willing to moderate the accusations against 
the Western oil industry’s activities in Azerbaijan. They would not go so far as 
to say that the companies want to be corrupt, but that when they operate in a 
country like Azerbaijan, they cannot avoid being caught in the net. The way they 
see it, there is a difference between the oil contracts made at government level, 
which are not corrupt, and contracts for services in the Azerbaijani infrastructure 
– as soon as the companies enter this arena, they tumble into the culture of cor-
ruption and become a part of it. Some would claim that this happens against the 
companies’ own wishes, but that they are powerless.  
The impression we are left with is that the opposition, which sees corruption 
as the biggest obstacle to positive development, thinks that the oil industry is 
blundering about in the dark on this question. They may have a different banner, 
but they’re marching in the same parade. Moreover, the perception is that the 
Western oil industry is capable of playing a much more active role in combating 
corruption than it actually does.  
Statoil 
We asked whether respondents thought that Statoil was just the same, different 
or very different from the other companies. No respondents thought Statoil 
worse than other oil companies; a majority thought it equally guilty of the offen-
ces with which they charged others, while a minority thought it better. In the 
table, different therefore means better. 
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In the light of the fact that this survey was commissioned by the Norwegian 
Ministry of Oil and Energy, we were particularly curious about the political 
opposition’s image of the Norwegian company Statoil. We therefore asked the 
question whether Statoil stood out from the other oil companies, and it was con-
firmed that this was the case, though not as positively as in our previous surveys 
of Azerbaijani perceptions of the Western oil industry. As many as 65% saw no 
difference between Statoil and other oil companies. Some had specific com-
plaints against Statoil, others argued in general terms. One argument was that 
Statoil is rather anonymous, the company has no independent profile. The reason 
for this may be Statoil’s long term collaboration with BP, in whose shadow the 
company has long lived. Some people thought that Statoil could profile itself 
more positively if it ‘liberated’ itself from its bigger partner.  
Some of the respondents (35%) were of the opinion that Statoil is better than 
other oil companies. Since this is a Norwegian survey, it is tempting to interpret 
this as empty courtesy, but that was not our impression. Moreover, as already 
mentioned a majority of the same sample (65%) are just as critical of Statoil as 
of the other companies. We are dealing here with high-powered elites, operating 
at a level where the political struggle is far more important than being polite to 
interviewers. They see such surveys as a continuation of their politics by other 
means. Given that previous and non-Norwegian questionnaires regarding per-
ceptions of the oil industry present Statoil in an even more positive light, the 
argument about respondent insincerity is unconvincing. 
Table 4 Does Statoil stand out from the other Western oil companies in 
Azerbaijan? 
 
Statoil is just the same as the others 13 
Statoil is different from the others (better) 5 
Statoil is very different from the others (much better) 2 
N= 20  
 
Of the respondents who thought that Statoil was better (7/20), two even ans-
wered that Statoil was much better. This is interesting, because one of these was 
former President Elchibey and the other one, Gambar, is often described as the 
opposition’s leading presidential candidate. 
In the light of the fact that Statoil is a Norwegian company and that the target 
group for this survey is primarily Norwegian and Azerbaijani, it may be of inter-
est to present more extensive examples of positive comments on Statoil. Nega-
tive comments are identical with criticism of Western oil companies in general 
and are collated in other chapters of this report.  
The positive attitudes expressed can by and large be classified under four 
main heads: 
Statoil exhibits greater empathy than other oil companies with the people 
and the country 
Statoil is different from the other oil companies and has a wise long term policy. 
Its good humanitarian development strategy shows that the company wants to 
work in the best interests of both Norway and Azerbaijan. Statoil is seen as a 
company that to a greater extent than others cares about what is going on in 
Azerbaijani society. It takes an interest in the Nagorno-Karabakh problem, in 
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culture and in civil society. After Statoil became independent of BP, we can see 
the company’s profile better.  
Azerbaijanis know that Norway is itself a quite newly independent nation and 
feel that it therefore understands their situation. By contrast, the oil companies 
from the big countries were viewed as leeches and sharks. This argument was 
supported by reference to the oil boom in Azerbaijan at the end of the nineteenth 
century. The passage of time has made this period semi-legendary, a vanished 
Golden Age, when the oil companies played a more positive role for Azerbaijani 
society. In this image of the past the Nobel brothers have a prominent place as 
capitalists with high moral principles and a capacity for empathy with the Azer-
baijani people, which they put into practice through large-scale building of 
schools and hospitals. Here Norway tends to benefit from people’s vagueness 
about the difference between Norway and Sweden. It is also noted that Scandi-
navians live more ‘among the people’ than the oil workers from bigger 
countries, who live in isolated enclaves. 
Statoil is interested in Azerbaijani art and culture. Kirkelig Kulturverksted 
(Church Cultural Workshop), the Norwegian Santal Mission and the choir Skruk 
(Sunnmøre Christian Youth Choir) have collaborated with Azerbaijani musici-
ans to produce a well-known and popular CD called ‘The country we come 
from’ (vocalists Brilliant and Ilgar Muradov). Their programme notes show one 
of the petrogylphs about which Thor Heyerdahl waxed enthusiastic. His books 
were legal and available even in the Soviet period, so he was a familiar figure; 
then it was very greatly appreciated that he has visited the country after libera-
tion. Once again this is interpreted as a positive sign of genuine Norwegian 
interest in Azerbaijan. The significance of this should not be exaggerated, but 
should not be written off either, given that it is taking place within the frame-
work of an already positive interpretative framework of Norwegian attitudes to 
Azerbaijan. After noting a striking likeness to Norwegian petroglyphs, 
Heyerdahl announced that the Norwegians surely came from Azerbaijan. How-
ever much we may smile at this, there is no doubt that the theory fell on good 
soil, and the credit he has earned for his various forms of support has ‘rubbed 
off’ on everything Norwegian including Statoil.  
Statoil practises a greater degree of openness than other oil companies  
Western oil companies are criticised for not openly stating their guidelines. 
Several of those who take a positive view of Statoil emphasise precisely that 
company’s willingness to be more transparent. For the opposition, greater trans-
parency is the alpha and omega, and so Statoil gets a lot of credit. With excep-
tion of the real corporate secrets, the respondents say, the Statoil employees tell 
us everything. By keeping even their policies secret, on the other hand, the other 
oil companies are objectively in alliance with the dictatorship, which is thus 
enabled to regale the National Assembly with dubious figures. For example, 
when the political opposition recently demanded more information, both indu-
stry and government maintained a deafening silence. The only exception was 
Statoil, whose president told the opposition that he agreed that they had a right 
to the information, but that he was forbidden to give it to them by the govern-
ment. 
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Statoil has better contact with the opposition than the other oil companies 
The political opposition enjoys good relations with Statoil. The company exhi-
bits what we might call normal behaviour – that is, it thinks in the long term. To 
do this it needs a wide range of contacts. Statoil is aware that there is a good 
chance that some day people from outside Aliev’s ‘machine’ will come to power 
in Azerbaijan. By contrast, BP-Amoco cultivates contacts exclusively around the 
Aliev clique. Statoil invites the political opposition to exhibitions and to events 
like the visit of Thor Heyerdahl. This attitude is related to what the respondents 
perceive as ‘typically Norwegian’ values – a solid grounding in democracy. 
Contact with the opposition is an integral part of the democratic rules of the 
road.  
Statoil has a greater sense of an equitable redistribution of the oil revenues 
than the other companies 
No one makes accusations against Statoil or alleges that it has done anything 
corrupt. It is a serious company. Statoil is in a special position because it comes 
from a small country with strong traditions of democracy and social justice. The 
respondents think that such a company is more likely to create fair and just 
contractual relations than the sharks from the big countries. They do not, for 
example, like the monopoly position BP-Amoco is in danger of acquiring in 
Azerbaijan. Monopolies are always bad, and a bigger role for Statoil will ame-
liorate this situation.  

Chapter 3 
  
Corruption and Oil in Azerbaijan –  
Is the Western Oil Industry an Accomplice? 
Some General Comments on Corruption as a Phenomenon 
Many of the interviewees echo the doctrine of Edmund Burke, that corruption 
deprives people of one of their most precious possessions: their freedom. A soci-
ety permeated by corruption like the Azerbaijani enslaves the inhabitants. This is 
not a matter of winners and losers, the paralysing culture of corruption affects 
everybody, and everyone is a victim of the system. Corruption prevents econo-
mic growth and development, it erodes respect for the law, and teaches that 
honest work is not where the rewards are to be found. Corruption demoralises 
people and destroys social cohesion. A corrupt society is a society in decadence 
and decline.  
If the Azerbaijanis are to experience a free, modern and stable society, they 
must break the chains of corruption. With their oil wealth and their pre-Commu-
nist democratic heritage, Azerbaijan should be in a position to give its citizens a 
good standard of living, and the conditions should be right for developing the 
rule of law that is so fundamental to democracy. The situation in present-day 
Azerbaijan is, on the contrary, that corruption is making the rich richer and the 
poor poorer. We have seen how the political elites that enjoy power are pocket-
ing public funds. This is the kind of thing that destabilises a country, and the 
prospects for the nation’s future are worrying. When the mass of the people see 
that they are not getting their rightful share of the oil wealth, they will sooner or 
later flock to political movements dedicated to revenge against the rulers. This 
has been seen in several of the oil states, for example in both socialist Algeria 
and imperial Iran.  
Free competition and corruption are like fire and water. Corruption effici-
ently negates the advantages of a free market. That market liberalism can func-
tion in a corrupt society is an illusion.  
Our data document that corruption at the top is one of the main complaints of 
the Azerbaijani political opposition. One of the main problems of the new state 
is a government apparatus whose employees have gained their posts not on merit 
but by bribery and nepotism enjoys no popular trust. A political leadership 
which, instead of setting a good example, exploits its position for personal 
enrichment forfeits legitimacy. A large proportion of the funds donated from 
abroad to help the refugees from the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh has dis-
appeared into the pockets of officials, and so these wretched victims are doubly 
marginalised. Moreover, it is not good economics for the money thus dishon-
estly appropriated is not reinvested in domestic production but stashed away as 
dead capital in foreign bank accounts. We have reason to believe that the current 
Azerbaijani leadership are valued clients of secretive foreign banks.  
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Given widespread corruption in the political leadership, in the government 
apparatus and in the market, it is hardly surprising that the ordinary citizen 
indulges in corruption too. Corruption becomes general and thus ‘normal’, and a 
common attitude is that it is nothing to get excited about. Pakistan is a good 
example of how bad it can get, with one set of criminals replacing another; there 
is no one who doesn’t have his fingers in the till.  
Geopolitical changes and transformations of the global economy after the 
cold war have aggravated the problem of corruption worldwide. It is therefore 
essential to take up arms against corruption and the unhealthy societies it cre-
ates, and history shows that this fight is not a hopeless one. The American ‘For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act’ criminalises the bribery of foreign officials. That 33 
OECD countries and 5 others in February 1999 approved regulations based on 
the philosophy of the American legislation was another step in the right direc-
tion. General Electric, Shell and Rio Tinto are examples of multinationals who 
have imposed a strict ethics code. The danger of being mired in corruption has 
led these companies to withdraw from what could otherwise have been lucrative 
business, as when Unilever pulled out of Bulgaria. In Italy, it was not until the 
big companies got tired of paying bribes that the big Tangentopoli investigation 
started. In Seoul, anyone can supervise public procurement over the Internet.  
Our respondents are pretty definite that the allocation of oil exploration and 
production licences in Azerbaijan is not done on the basis of free competition. 
One of the main principles of the Act was the doctrine that a company paying a 
bribe is as guilty as the person who receives it; this attracted great interest 
among our sample of interviewees, particularly in connection with the bonuses 
paid by Western oil companies when contracts are signed in Azerbaijan. It was 
claimed that this money never appears in any official accounts and no one 
knows where it goes. The interviewees are quite sure that all of it goes straight 
into the pockets of President Aliev and his henchmen. They think it essential to 
make it known that anyone who pays these bonuses is collaborating with Aliev 
and his machine, and that the one party to the deal is just as guilty as the other. 
Fortunately, few or none of the oil companies involved in Azerbaijan are willing 
to go as far as the French oil company Elf, which bought governments, installed 
African presidents and orchestrated coups against others. On the contrary, it is a 
hopeful sign that many Western oil companies are currently very concerned 
about the problem and interested in doing something about it.  
In the campaign against this omnipresent and paralysing corruption, what is 
happening in Chile, Slovakia and Latvia can serve as a model for Azerbaijan. In 
these countries the people at the top have displayed a willingness to eliminate 
corruption. They have appointed anti-corruption committees and commissioners 
to enhance the effectiveness of investigation procedures and to amend the tax, 
labour and criminal laws. Honest officials are rewarded. Such a step in Azerbai-
jan would represent a radical break with tradition. As long as the people at the 
top are hopelessly corrupt themselves, it may seem like a lost cause, but as we 
saw above, it does pay to take the offensive. Western oil companies can become 
a positive influence, but they must first make up their minds to do so. Up to now 
their motto seems to be ‘We take care never to be mixed up in corruption, we 
can do no more than that’. Or: ‘We are not corrupt, corruption is part of Azerbai-
jani culture, we’re against it but not responsible.’ Measured against the ethical 
codes now being formulated by the most progressive multinationals, this think-
ing is obsolete. Western oil companies have an objective moral responsibility if, 
as our interviewees assert, their activities have led to increased corruption. There 
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is indeed much to suggest that the Western oil industry – probably unknowingly 
and inadvertently – indirectly helps not only to maintain this culture of corrup-
tion but even to aggravate it.  
The Latvian Minister of Justice Valdis Birkav deserves to be quoted here: 
‘Corruption is like an iceberg, we tow it out into the warm waters of publicity 
and it melts.’ Corruption thrives best in the dark; if the oil industry were more 
supportive of freedom of speech in Azerbaijan, it would be helping to tow that 
iceberg into the warm water. Wherever there is freedom of speech, great things 
can be done. By advertising solely in press media that support the dictatorship, 
and by appearing solely on TV channels that are controlled by the government, 
as our respondents complain the Western oil industry does, they are playing on 
the same side as a corrupt regime.  
The interviewees’ simple, and probably effective, suggestion to the oil com-
panies is therefore that they advertise equally in the opposition press and appear 
equally in TV channels controlled by the opposition. Such a practice would give 
the opposition increased status, not to mention revenues, and would be a leg-up 
for democracy. It would also help to tow that iceberg into warmer waters. 
Situational and Dispositional Causal Explanations for 
Corruption. Intuitive Analyses 
Cognitive psychology devotes much attention to the way we draw conclusions 
about our own and others’ behaviour. In daily life we are always analysing cause 
and effect on the basis of our ‘instincts’ and ‘intuition’ – it is this aspect of 
human behaviour that has inspired the term ‘intuitive scientists’. 
When our interviewees were confronted with the same questions as dealt 
with in academic studies of corruption, they produced what we might call ‘intui-
tive analyses’.  
Cognitive studies show that explanations of others’ behaviour, and most 
especially their undesired or unexpected behaviour, systematically exaggerate 
the particular features of those actors, in what the jargon calls a dispositional ex-
planation. In contrast, explanations of one’s own behaviour emphasise the situ-
ational variables. In other words, I acted this way because I had no choice, but 
he acted that way because he’s a bad man. The same thing happens at national 
and corporate level: we are defending our vital interests, you are imperialists; we 
are avoiding bankruptcy, you are greedy exploiters. People are judgemental, 
they enjoy being judgemental, and they are always pleased to be told that every-
thing is the fault of some other rascal – the inherently wicked not-me, the Other. 
In the work of analysing corruption, we are confronted with a series of sup-
posed explanations. Most discussions operate with a dichotomy – corruption 
driven by greed and corruption driven by the need to survive. The interesting 
aspect of the first explanation that it is a dispositional attribution, links the ques-
tion of ‘guilt’ to the individual. It is the inherent characteristics of the individual 
who performs corrupt acts that explain why there is corruption. In Azerbaijan, 
the individual-characteristic explanation is applied to the elite (except that it is 
here called by the pejorative term ‘clique’) that sits on the top of the heap and 
pulls the strings. The political elite is greedy and devoid of any social consci-
ence, and as long it remains in power nothing much can be done. Attributing the 
behaviour to the characteristics of the individual in this way mobilises the obser-
ver’s emotional reaction, his affective structures. Doing this is a vital and power-
ful move in all political mobilisation and in the rhetoric of revolution or coup. 
Daniel Heradstveit 
nupi november 00 
34 
Sometimes this dispositional analysis is generalised to levels below the power 
elite, with complaints of the moral degeneracy of the Azerbaijani nation as such. 
The other approach is to relate corruption to structural conditions. The obser-
ver will then ‘acquit’ the individual, he or she is innocent because acting under 
duress. Here it is the distancing cognitive analysis that prevails, the affective 
component is repressed. In the Azerbaijani situation, for instance, it may take the 
form of the assertion that the police are corrupt because the police force is over-
manned – by 50% – and thereby underpaid. It is not the individual characteris-
tics of the policemen that make them corrupt, but the situation that forces them 
into corruption. The analytic literature identifies many such causes of corruption 
in structural conditions. Low pay of officials obliges them to take bribes in order 
to feed their families. Many states still lack an independent judiciary, which 
means that corrupt judges will not be punished by other branches of government, 
and potentially honest judges cannot risk the displeasure of the regime. There is 
no adequate rule of law of which a corruption-hunter could make use. Empirical 
studies show that there is more corruption in the public than in the private sector. 
When authoritarian penal methods are abandoned in the drive to democracy, the 
result is that there is no check on corruption at all. The literature emphasises the 
theory that when a culture of corruption has first taken root, the individual is 
enmeshed in a system which is almost impossible to break out of; a relationship 
of mutual dependence develops between the giver and the taker of bribes.  
On the basis of cognitive attribution theory, our main hypothesis is that the 
Azerbaijani opposition will exaggerate the extent to which corruption is due to 
characteristics of the individuals presently on top of the power hierarchy. The 
following table shows the results of our coding of the explanations proffered by 
our interviewees for the high level of corruption in Azerbaijan.  
Table 5 Causal explanations of corrupt behaviour in Azerbaijan  
 
Causal explanations of corrupt 
Azerbaijani behaviour 
 
Causal explanations of corrupt Western 
oil company behaviour 
Situational Dispositional Situational Dispositional 
7 10 19 24 
N = 17  N = 33  
Situational Explanations of Corrupt Azerbaijani Behaviour 
Table 5 above shows that situational and dispositional explanations of Azerbai-
jani corruption are divided fairly evenly, with a certain preponderance of the dis-
positional ones. In other words, the interviewees see corruption as residing 
partly in human frailty and partly in structural conditions. It was emphasised that 
in a society where corruption is widespread, the individual will be coerced into 
playing the game; he will be recruited by being tempted to commit minor irregu-
larities and the leverage thus obtained will be used to compel him to do some-
thing more serious. If he refuses to obey his orders, he will be threatened with 
publication of ‘the file on him’ and prosecution for previous corrupt acts. Few 
dare to speak out against corruption because they fear that the searchlight may 
then be turned on them.  
Many respondents deny emphatically that corruption is an integral part of 
Azerbaijani culture. In principle Azerbaijanis are not corrupt, they say, and refer 
Part I Descriptive Analysis 
nupi november 00 
35 
to opinion polls in which everyone is ‘against corruption’. As these respondents 
see it, the corruption is due to unjust political arrangements through the ages, 
with the Soviet period as the most recent and worst example. ‘It was the Russi-
ans who brought corruption to Azerbaijan’ is an oft-heard refrain. Others reject 
this, and conclude that it is the new epoch that has brought corruption: if Azer-
baijan is more corrupt than other former Soviet republics, that is because it has 
progressed further in democratisation, and it is well-known that the introduction 
of democracy for the first time, and transition from a planned to a market eco-
nomy, increase corruption in all countries. Yet others deny that Azerbaijan is 
more corrupt than other states anyway, since in the Soviet Union everyone was 
corrupt! 
Dispositional Explanations of Corrupt Azerbaijani Behaviour 
When the respondents make dispositional attributions, it is the regime that is 
ascribed the corrupt disposition and not the nation as such. Azerbaijanis are not 
corrupt, just the people at the top – what we call the ‘black-top image’. Ordinary 
people are honest and upright, and if they are enmeshed in corrupt behaviour, 
this is against their will. The rulers have little in common with the grass roots as 
regards mentality and conduct – the ‘fat cats’ have developed a culture of greed, 
totally devoid of any social conscience or sense of fair play. Some of the respon-
dents talk about the Aliev ‘clan’, since the charmed circle includes his brothers, 
sons, nephews as well as his friends, but others thought the term misleading, and 
preferred ‘network’.  
The interviewees, who are prominent representatives of the political opposi-
tion, therefore share the perception that as long as the current regime is in power, 
the problem of corruption will never be solved. With a corrupt power elite and a 
government linked to the black economy, it is useless to take up the struggle. 
Widespread corruption prevents the oil revenues benefiting the country and its 
people, as the money goes into the pockets of the rulers instead of being produc-
tively invested. Azerbaijan can become the new Nigeria. Some respondents 
refuse to paint so bleak a picture, despite everything there are strong democratic 
forces in Azerbaijan that may be able to break the culture of corruption. 
The interviewees asserted that foreign investors were shocked at the ability of 
the rulers to keep financial transactions secret. The lack of transparency is the 
very power base of the culture of corruption. Some claim – but on this point 
there is no consensus among the respondents – that Western oil companies that 
show signs of wanting to do something about it are compelled to pull out of the 
country. There was also disappointment that Western oil companies can make 
profitable agreements with a dictator who does not hesitate to violate human 
rights. And as long as the rulers fail to respect the laws of the land, no one can 
expect that the ordinary people will do so. Azerbaijan is in a state of moral 
decline; despite the fact that most people are strongly against corruption, there 
exists a legalised nihilism. 
As an example of the cynicism that characterises the little clique at the top, 
the respondents cited the diversion of foreign aid for the poor and marginalised 
refugees. The ‘fat cats’ have no scruples about helping themselves to this 
money, most of it disappears into corrupt pockets and little of it reaches the 
people for whom it was intended. 
The above results show that the political front lines are not entirely locked, 
and so there should be a basis for a certain degree of collaboration in the fight 
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against corruption. The Azerbaijani opposition explains corruption primarily as a 
result of the greed that animates the ruling clique, but it is worth noting that 
structural and situational features of society are also identified and held respon-
sible. The political opposition is willing to admit that the problem is complex 
and has many causes. However, in periods with a more polarised and hostile 
tone between government and opposition there is reason to believe that the 
regime will be given all of the blame for corruption. 
Situational Explanations of Western Oil Companies’ Attitudes to 
Corruption in Azerbaijan  
Several of the interviewees considered that Western oil companies that set up in 
Azerbaijan are forced to pay bribes, and that they thus become part of the culture 
of corruption against their will. This does not necessarily apply to agreements 
made at government level, it is said, but operators who buy from subcontractors, 
for example, may not have a choice. To get the oil out of Azerbaijan, the oil 
companies are dependent on Azerbaijani infrastructure and other services, which 
are permeated by corruption. Some assert that the senior managers of the West-
ern oil companies are straight, others distanced themselves even further from the 
suggestion that the companies were corrupt, by pointing out that the big Western 
companies have a reputation to protect and that they are exclusively interested in 
doing business in accordance with ethical principles. 
From the general observation that it was difficult to do business in Azerbai-
jan without paying bribes, the conclusion was often drawn that Western oil com-
panies were not clean, but this suggestion was rarely supported by hard evi-
dence. The oil companies, it was said, operate in a culture where it is fully 
acceptable to take unlawful advantage. Western investors who became involved 
with the country after the fall of the Soviet Union had raised the corruption 
level. Some interviewees therefore concluded that increased Western activity has 
increased corruption. Others reasoned otherwise, but came to the same conclu-
sion, namely that since almost all national income comes from the oil industry 
and the level of corruption is high, corruption must necessarily be linked to the 
oil industry. 
The ordinary Azerbaijani sees Western oil companies as part of Aliev’s cor-
rupt system, and that they are thus helping to maintain that system. The assertion 
that collaborating with a corrupt regime makes the oil companies themselves 
corrupt is an interesting way to approach things. It implies that, even if you 
never pay bribes yourself, you are not innocent of corruption, for you are still 
operating in a corrupt context and aiding and abetting a corrupt regime. All 
Western companies that set up shop in the former Soviet Union sooner or later 
become involved in corruption. They become part of a culture characterised by 
secrecy, the cornerstone of corruption. When the dictator tells the oil companies 
to lie for him, they lie for him. An example of this is the Azerbaijani state oil 
company, SOCAR; there is no public inspection of SOCAR’s accounts, not even 
ministers get to see any figures. Nor do Western oil companies reveal what they 
pay to SOCAR, thus helping it to keep its affairs secret. 
Several of the interviewees understand the oil companies’ behaviour because 
they are painted into a corner; they are powerless to deal with the culture of cor-
ruption and don’t know what to do. Nevertheless, for a company that is in prin-
ciple against corruption, the choice must be between accepting it and leaving the 
country. By paying the dictator money which he deposits in his foreign bank 
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accounts, the Western oil companies are institutionalising Azerbaijani corrup-
tion. Solid foreign companies in Azerbaijan that earn money without being cor-
rupt serve as signposts, showing the people that it is not, after all, a law of nature 
that you have to be corrupt to survive. 
Dispositional Explanations of Western Oil Companies’ Attitudes 
to Corruption in Azerbaijan 
The general perception is that Western oil companies are in principle honest and 
against corruption, but that the country is so corrupt that they are compelled 
willy-nilly to make fatal compromises. The interviewees are thus ‘acquitting’ the 
oil companies of ‘guilt’ by their intuitive analysis in terms of situational attribu-
tions. However, there was also a school of thought among the respondents that 
the oil companies were indulging in corrupt practices with open eyes, even that 
they were corrupt before setting foot in Azerbaijan. 
A form of corruption practiced by the companies quite deliberately is to 
restrict competition for assignments. Invitations to tender in the oil industry are 
very often secret, and companies with a record of assignments are favoured. The 
principle of free competition is thus an illusion, which has been extremely de-
structive for Azerbaijan.  
Some people went further than merely hinting that the oil companies do cor-
rupt deals with the government. For example, it was mentioned that in 1998 a 
million tonnes equivalent of oil disappeared without trace. Even if Western oil 
companies knew where it went, they refused to say. Another recurrent accusa-
tion is that the oil companies pay bribes to the dictator for contracts – there is a 
mutual admiration society between him and the companies. It is usual to pay a 
bonus on the signing of oil contracts. Accusations of corruption related to these 
bonuses were the most frequent among the interviewees, and ordinary 
Azerbaijanis are also very concerned about this. It was emphasised that this 
bonus money vanishes without trace, which surely means that it goes into the 
‘fat cats’’ pockets. This has become a big problem, not only for the dictator, but 
also for the oil companies, because they are held responsible for the money 
going astray and yet either cannot or will not say where it ends up. This line of 
argument entirely brushes aside the oil companies’ claims that they don’t know 
what is really going on, for it is their duty to know.  
If Western oil companies are, as they claim, against corruption, this must be 
expressed in an open policy that allows public access, even if this is not what the 
regime wants. Instead of access, however, the oil companies are practising sec-
recy, not only about the contracts but also about accidents; they lie about them 
and keep Azeri specialists at arm’s length when corrective action is taken. Much 
of what Western oil companies get up to does not tolerate the light of day. Un-
less the oil companies rethink their policy, it was said, they risk meeting the 
same fate as they did in the Iranian revolution, that is, being nationalised. The 
behaviour of the oil companies in Azerbaijan is remarkably like that in the 
Shah’s Iran. Finally, the oil companies show their true colours by never support-
ing Azerbaijani NGOs that are working against corruption. 
Conclusion 
The above results show that corruption faces Western oil companies with an 
important and serious problem in Azerbaijan. Large sectors of the political oppo-
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sition regard the oil companies as co-conspirators in the high level of corruption. 
Either because they are inherently corrupt themselves, or in order not to provoke 
a corrupt government, they are tacitly accepting a culture of corruption. If condi-
tions change, so that present-day oppositionals come to power, the oil industry 
may suffer for it. For this reason Western oil industry should take a more activist 
line, they must clearly show that they want to work against corruption.  
Chapter 4 
 
Does the Western Oil Industry Risk 
 Accelerating the Islamisation of Azerbaijan? 
Our work was informed by an interest in competing political ideologies in Azer-
baijan – ideologies that have radically different attitudes to democracy and 
human rights. On the basis of our survey we identified three distinct and antago-
nistic ideological families with relevance to democracy and human rights: 
Three Competing Ideologies 
 
1 Secularism (a political ideology based on the separation of state and religion) 
2 Ethno-nationalism (a political ideology based on the principle of the national-
ism of a single ethnic group) 
3 Islamism (a political ideology based on the principle that religion should pro-
vide guidelines for government, ‘theocracy’) 
 
In order better to capture the various ideological shades, we chose an indirect 
strategy for our questions. The questions seemed to have a stimulating effect on 
our interviewees and we received some good answers. We asked the respondents 
themselves to describe their identity (see the questions in the Appendix I). Our 
conclusion is that the relative strength of the three competing political ideologies 
we have identified in our sample corresponds very closely to the situation as de-
scribed in available literature about Azerbaijan (for an analysis based on secon-
dary sources see Heradstveit and Strømmen 1999). One main conclusion is that 
Islamism is weak. The interesting question, however, is the potential of Islamism 
in a country like Azerbaijan.  
The respondents were questioned on this subject, and we will return to their 
answers. First, however, we will report their responses regarding their sense of 
identity, which is an indirect measure of the strength of the three competing 
ideologies we mentioned.  
The Secularist – a Citizen of the Multiethnic State Azerbaijan  
Table 6 Self-identification as citizen of the multiethnic state Azerbaijan 
 
Primary identity 12 
Secondary identity 3 
Tertiary identity 3 
N = 20  
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It is apparent from Table 6 that 60% of the sample consider themselves primar-
ily as citizens of the currently multiethnic state of Azerbaijan; in other words, 
that they consider Azerbaijan as a nation-state. This suggests that a majority of 
the sample are in accord with the modern form of nation-building, that is, that 
the state is obliged to safeguard the rights of all individual citizens irrespective 
of ethnic background and religion. The contrast here is with states in which the 
rights of the individual citizen are determined by ethnic background (ethno-
nationalism) or religion (Islamism). Moreover, the interview data indicate that 
several of the respondents in this category are operating with what we would call 
multiculturalism. This nation-building concept aims to integrate, not exclude the 
minorities, who are entitled to retain and practise their own culture and religion. 
It contrasts with the traditional French nation-building concept dominated by 
assimilationism – Africans and Vietnamese were taught to speak of ‘Our ances-
tors the Gauls’. Circumstances have now compelled the adoption of much more 
tolerance of minority languages and dialects in modern France, but other states 
that have cultivated French assimilationism are still hung up in it – Turkey, with 
its insistence on calling the Kurds ‘mountain Turks’ being a notorious and tragic 
example. The challenge facing the multiculturalists is to redefine all existing 
symbols and thereby give them a new content with which both the majority 
population and the minorities can identify, and which functions to unite and 
mobilise. In most Muslim states, nation-building has failed, because minorities 
have been met with an intolerance that has led to conflicts – the minorities have 
never felt themselves to be part of the nation. 
While the present regime in its definition of secularism has exhibited a cer-
tain degree of intolerance as regards religion and minorities, the majority of the 
elite respondents have championed a nation-building concept in line with the 
Western. In no other Muslim state of the region do we find modern thinking on 
nation-states as strongly represented as in Azerbaijan, which gives the country a 
special position as regards the prospects for democracy and human rights. The 
nationalism of the respondents is not turned against ethnic minorities. As an 
example of this, we would mention that one of the interviewees who was previ-
ously Minister of Education, had encouraged the minorities to found their own 
schools and write and speak their own languages – a very different approach to 
Turkey’s.  
Some of the interviewees, on the other hand, called themselves neo-
Musavatis, with a different concept of ethnicity and nationalism than the tradi-
tional Musavat party, founded in 1917 and the symbol of Azerbaijani indepen-
dence, identity and the forging of an Azerbaijani nationalism. In traditional 
Musavat thinking, the ethnic Turk has a privileged position, but the neo-
Musavatis include everyone who lives in Azerbaijan, whether of Turkish, Cau-
casian or Persian background. That is why we should call ourselves Azerbai-
janis, they say.  
The Ethno-nationalist – a Pan-Turk 
30% of the interviewees said it was more important to belong to the greater Tur-
kic community than to be an Azerbaijani (a citizen of multiethnic Azerbaijan): 
Part I Descriptive Analysis 
nupi november 00 
41 
Table 7 Self-identification as member of the greater Turkic community 
 
Primary identity 6 
Secondary identity 12 
Tertiary identity 1 
Irrelevant 1 
N = 20  
 
This is a pointer that ethno-nationalism – of which former President Elchibey is 
one of the foremost proponents – enjoys a strong position. He maintains that the 
population of Azerbaijan, which in this terminology is called Northern Azerbai-
jan, should unite with their ‘kith and kin’ in North-west Iran (Southern Azerbai-
jan), where most of the Iranian Azeris live. An interesting fact in this connection 
is that the Azeri population of Iran is said be between 15 and 20 million, by 
some put as high as 25 million, while the population of Azerbaijan is a mere 8 
million. The figures, particularly the Iranian one, are uncertain, but is also clear 
that the number of Azeris in Iran is being exaggerated for propaganda reasons. 
During my fieldwork in Baku, in September and October 1999, the media made 
a big fuss of the birth of Citizen No. 8,000,000. It was no big surprise that this 
boy-child was given the name of Aliev! Ethno-nationalism concentrates primar-
ily on the Azeri population, which speaks a Turkic language, so it is correct to 
classify this variant of ethno-nationalism under the rubric of Pan-Turkism. How-
ever, even if other Turks are seen as ‘ethnic brethren’, the relationship with Tur-
key itself is not a simple one. The Azerbaijanis, for instance, claim to be the first 
to use the word ‘Turk’, but others claim that Turkey’s nation-builders ‘stole’ the 
name and monopolised it.  
That Pan-Turkism is a vital force in modern Azerbaijan was clearly seen 
when we were in Baku in the autumn of 1999, witnessing demonstrations for the 
Azerbaijani cause in Nagorno-Karabakh. There were many demonstrators who 
carried the emblem of the Grey Wolves. These are extreme ethno-nationalists 
focussing on Turkish ethnicity and Pan-Turkism, and who had a startlingly good 
election in Turkey just recently. There can be no doubt that the ethnic orientation 
in Azerbaijani nation-building, in which the Azeris will be privileged at the 
expense of the minorities, is still very much alive, although not perhaps as strong 
as immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union, when ethno-nationalism flour-
ished throughout the region. The big wave of post-liberation ethno-nationalism 
has now subsided. In conversation with us, former President Elchibey claimed 
that he had not abandoned his dream of uniting all the Azeris, but even if a few 
others in the sample expressed some sympathy for irredentism and thought it a 
desirable outcome, they also indicated that they thought it Utopian. The elite 
members who gave the Turkic-speaking community as their primary affiliation 
considered that Azerbaijani nation-building initially must be based on the major-
ity group in Azerbaijan. This view fits poorly with Western democratisation and 
is fissile. It is thus encouraging to see that as many as 60% do not identify with 
it, but rather support a consensual line in which minority groups will have the 
same protection and rights as the majority. The minority shall be able to practise 
its religion and culture and speak its own language. 
It was claimed that Atatürk faced three competing identities: Turkish natio-
nalism, Islam and Ottomanism. The perception of some of the respondents was 
that if Islam and/or Ottomanism had prevailed, there would be no such thing as 
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Turkey. Certain similarities between Turkey and Azerbaijan therefore made 
them emphasise that they regarded themselves as ‘Azerbaijani Turks’. 
For several respondents, ethno-nationalist thinking inspired the line that they 
perceived themselves as Azerbaijanis as regards citizenship but Turks as regards 
ethnicity or nation. They did not distinguish between the Azeris living in Iran 
(our kith and kin), and the Azeris living in Azerbaijan. These ‘Azerbaijani 
Turks’ could quite happily live in Iran. One of the respondents said: ‘When they 
call me an Azeri in Turkey, I don’t like it, because it implies that I am not like 
the real Turks. But we in Azerbaijan were the first to call ourselves Turks, and 
so we have a better right to the name than the people now living in Turkey. But I 
like to be called an Azeri when I’m in Iran, because that shows that the Iranian 
Azeris are aware of their Turkic heritage, and are doing it to defy the Iranian 
state.’ 
The interviewees complained that both Russia and Iran had suppressed and 
oppressed their culture, that Russian policy was about pressurising Azerbaijani 
Turks in the direction of Iran and to the area that is now Azerbaijan. At the same 
time they expanded the area of the Armenian state. Azerbaijan Turks used to 
inhabit an area that stretched from the Black Sea to the Caspian, claimed the 
respondents. Armenia was only a little area and half of Yerevan’s population 
were Azerbaijanis – none of whom now live there.  
 It was also said that the ‘Azerbaijani Turkish nation’ comprises 40 million 
people, not 8 million. The 8 million are only that portion of the nation that lives 
within the borders of Azerbaijan. A nation is based on a national majority popu-
lation that then develops a national identity. Only after having returned to their 
roots should they think about becoming liberal, adopting democracy and the 
market model. 
The Islamist – a Member of the Muslim C0mmunity 
Table 8 Self-identification as member of the Muslim community 
 
Primary identity 2 
Secondary identity 2 
Tertiary identity 7 
Irrelevant 9 
N = 20  
 
The results of Table 8 are hardly surprising. The trend is entirely in line with 
what we had previously read in the secondary literature. The country has a more 
superficial relationship with Islam than do the Central Asian republics. This is 
connected with both a strong secular influence earlier last century and the subse-
quent Soviet period in which an attempt was made to exterminate all religion, 
when atheist universities were established and atheist was a term of pride. The 
names Nobel and Rothschild are legacies of the oil boom of the early twentieth 
century. Of greater importance, perhaps, is the fact that Azerbaijan, indepen-
dently of other countries, developed a rich cultural and intellectual life domi-
nated by secularism and Western affiliations. The whole period culminated in 
the creation of the Democratic Republic of 1918–1921 – a symbolic lighthouse 
in today’s work for democracy and human rights. This greater strength of demo-
cratic traditions than in the Central Asian states has consequences for the effort 
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to promote democratic ideals now. It is rare to find such a strong and articulate 
opposition in a Muslim country. Turkey is an exception, and Iran is moving fit   
fully in the same direction.  
The strong secular orientation that characterises Azerbaijan explains why as 
much as 45% of our sample say that Islam is no part of their identity. Only 35% 
mention Islam as the tertiary element of their identity, but even then call them-
selves ‘cultural’ Muslims. This means that they do not identify with Islam’s 
metaphysical message, but fully accept that they and their culture are influenced 
by Islam.  
Of the two respondents who ranked Islam as the most important component 
of their identity, one was the leader of the Islamist Party that is now proscribed 
in Azerbaijan. The other was the imam of a mosque with deep roots in Azerbai-
jani history, and who is currently on a collision course with alive.  
A consistent feature of the literature on Azerbaijan is not just the variety of 
opinions we encounter, but also the sometimes considerable uncertainty regard-
ing the potential of Islam after the fall of the Soviet Union and its strength in 
Azerbaijan today. The need for more research on this topic is emphasised. For 
us, this is important because Islam’s recruitment area is relevant to an assess-
ment of political Islam as an ideological competitor of current secularism. The 
fact that in many Muslim states the oil economy has created favourable conditi-
ons for Islamism is due mainly to the failure to let oil revenues benefit the mas-
ses – it has been squandered or appropriated by the corrupt elite. A possible sce-
nario for Azerbaijan, too, is that the corrupt elite continues to pocket the oil 
revenues and stash them away in foreign banks, while ordinary people experi-
ence little or no improvement in their daily lives, indeed the social-economic 
situation deteriorates. In such a situation, claimed most of our respondents, it is 
not inconceivable that people will rally to political Islam as an alternative to 
secularism. At the same time, a minority dismissed the chance of this happening 
in the thoroughly secularised Azerbaijan. 
Azerbaijan as Islamic Republic: the Theocratic Minority 
Those of the respondents who advocate basing politics on Islamic principles 
justified their views with ‘Islam is our morality’. They see the Holy Qur’an as 
Azerbaijan’s primary ideology, and one that can reconcile all the warring 
factions in the country. They claim that even if the educated study the Qur’an in 
Arabic, it would be good if everyone could read it in their own language, and 
would therefore like to see it translated into Azeri. (Comment: this is an 
extremely unusual point of view. Traditionally, the Qur’an is immutable and 
cannot be translated, a so-called translation is merely ‘the meaning of the 
Qur’an’. This means that the Azerbaijani Islamists really are more ‘moderate’ 
than most of their co-religionists.) 
It was claimed that a revitalisation of Islam was under way throughout Azer-
baijan, and that it was untrue – as is sometimes claimed – that this revival is 
strongest along the Iranian border. Even in the Soviet period people felt affili-
ated to Islam. As soon as the Communist pressure was lifted, everyone was a 
believer. Even Aliev has been on the hajj. The first president of independent 
Azerbaijan, Ayaz Mutabilov, who now lives in Russia, has become a devout 
believer, as has Isa Gambar, the current chairman of Musavat. The interviewees 
also mentioned a special programme to help refugees both morally and financi-
ally: ‘As Allah says, the poor are our family.’  
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There is no prohibition on contact with Islamic movements abroad. So far, no 
such contact exists, it was said, but it is hoped that it will be established when 
supporters of a governance based on Islamic principles can be registered as poli-
tical parties. The respondents stated that they do not support the fighters in 
Chechnya and Dagestan, because in their opinion these were merely exploiting 
Islamic slogans and were moreover heretics following the Wahhabi version of 
Islam invented by the Saudis. In Azerbaijan, they said, the Wahhabis are weak 
but might be able to cause a little trouble. When Aliev prohibited demonstrati-
ons, it was their exploitation by the Wahhabis he had in mind.  
Azerbaijan as Islamic Republic: the Optimistic Secularists 
The respondents saw Islam as primarily a cultural phenomenon in Azerbaijan. 
Some thought it was foolish to ban the veil, others agreed with the Supreme 
Court judgement that prohibited it (pronounced while we were there, and as far 
as we could judge, highly controversial). As they said, ‘Church and state should 
be separate, and in the public space you have to obey the state’s rules, not the 
church’s’. 
One argument that recurred was that Azerbaijan would never become an Isla-
mic state, because under Communism 70% of the population became atheists. 
But suppressing religious fanaticism, the Russians actually did something posi-
tive in Azerbaijan – if only this one thing. They agitated for rational scientific 
Communism; we don’t want Communism, but we’ll happily keep the scientific 
rationalism.  
90% of the population want the country to stay a secular state. The religious 
fanaticism of Iran has served less as an inspiration than as a deterrent. Besides, 
calling Iran an Islamic state is to misuse the word. The interviewees described 
various Iranian perceptions of Azerbaijan; some consider it more advanced than 
their own country, because of the greater degree of freedom.  
The conclusion of the optimist secularists was that free and fair elections 
would sweep away the present corrupt leadership, removing any possible basis 
for Islamism.  
Azerbaijan as Islamic Republic: the Majority sees Islamism as a 
Real Possibility  
The interviewees all agreed that Islam has strengthened its position in compari-
son with the Soviet period, but that political Islam, which peaked in 1994–95, 
was now in decline. 
Islamic influence from foreign states and outside movements 
a) Ideological pressure 
Under the Iranian Constitution, the country is actually obligated to disseminate 
the Islamic message. Together with the common border, the respondents said, 
this makes the Islamist threat very real. Iranian missionaries in Azerbaijan used 
to set out to convert Shi’a Muslims to political Islam. They established cells all 
over the country and conducted very powerful propaganda, of which one of the 
slogans was: ‘Azerbaijan has been oriented to the West, and what has the 
country got out of it? Nothing whatever.’ This missionary drive reached its cli-
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max in 1994–95 and looked really dangerous; Aliev was afraid of the export of 
Islamic revolution and the respondents thought he was right to do so. Iranian 
missionaries were then forbidden to conduct propaganda and were finally roun-
ded up and sent home. The interviewees – except for the two Islamists – entirely 
supported Aliev when in 1995 he proscribed the Islamist Party and threw five of 
its leaders into prison on charges of spying for Islam. Muslim activists were ever 
after regarded as Iranian spies, so Aliev’s strategy was extremely effective and 
inflicted a serious defeat on Islamism.  
The respondents also maintained that Saudi Arabia was very active, not only 
in Chechnya and Dagestan, but in Azerbaijan too. Here the missionary creed was 
Wahhabism – the puritanical Saudi version of the Sunna that is widely consid-
ered heretical. They also thought that Chechnya had no interest in causing 
trouble in Azerbaijan, but that if Islamism ever took root in Dagestan, then this 
would represent an indirect danger. Some of the respondents aired the idea that 
aggressive Islamism might theoretically appeal to the Lezgian minority – who 
live on both sides of the Dagestani border and are Sunnis, as opposed to the 
majority of Azerbaijanis, who are Shi’is – but added that the Lezgians had taken 
a clear stand against it. Even if the Sunni minorities are ‘infected’, the majority, 
the Shi’i Azeris, will protect the integrity of Azerbaijan.  
In other words, Azerbaijan has political Islam on both sides, the interviewees 
said. On the one hand the conditions for Islamism in Azerbaijan were no favour-
able and the danger thus rather theoretical, but on the other hand, it was neces-
sary to be on guard and not wait before taking countermeasures. Nevertheless, 
many respondents were very much opposed to the ultra-hard line taken by 
Turkey.  
b) War and crises 
The respondents expressed great unease at the fact that during the crises in 
Chechnya and Dagestan, the Russians doled out arms to 10,000 Lezgians, 
because among other things this could encourage Lezgian secessionism and lead 
to the destabilisation of Azerbaijan. They said that when the Russians, who are 
losing their grip on northern Caucasus, arm ethnic groups in Dagestan, this is 
formally in order to fight Islamism, but actually just to create trouble all round, 
so that Russia can then step in to order to ‘restore law and order’ – in other 
words, the same old imperial game of divide and rule.  
The interviewees also mentioned the Western protests against the First 
Chechen War of 1994–96. There are no protests against the oppression today, 
because the current war is seen as one waged against an aggressive Islam, and 
this is offensive to us. Russia may be interested in destabilising Azerbaijan. 
There are still many socialist groups in the country who enjoy close relations 
with Russia and who are supported by Moscow. Azerbaijan cannot feel safe with 
these parties around, it was said.  
The respondents mentioned that there are supposed to be about 55 Islamic 
activist organisations in Russia itself. Political Islam is growing stronger in 
Russia because Islam is the main identity marker for Russian Muslims and is 
politicised as a counterbalance and weapon against Russian chauvinism, arro-
gance and oppression.  
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Domestic political factors that could accelerate the growth of political Islam 
A majority of the respondents maintained that if there has not so far been any 
basis for an Islamic state, this is due to 70 years of Communism and the aban-
donment of Islamic values in this period. There is little to be seen of Islam in 
modern Azerbaijan, but if the situation deteriorates, there is some fear that the 
Islamists will come out of the woodwork.  
The interviewees emphasised that socio-economic developments have their 
own logic and will be decisive for the power position of the Islamists in Azerbai-
jan. When people are poor, they look for new ideas, and given the proximity of 
Iran and Northern Caucasus, they have not far to look. Sufficient disappointment 
over the West and democracy, and sufficient desperation, will do the trick. 
People will rally to political Islam, not because they are particularly religious, 
but because they think it will help them to a better life. Even if secularism is 
strong, they said, we have seen how Christian missionaries who came in and 
worked with the poor after the fall of the Soviet Union have made 5–10 000 
thousand converts. The excellent socialwelfare networks run by Islamists will 
easily win people to their side. Five years ago the prospects of an Islamic state 
were close the zero, but the current economic and social policies make it not 
unthinkable for Azerbaijan to become an Islamic Republic. Social injustice 
increases interest in Islam, but the respondents were convinced that with a new 
government that worked for social justice, the politicising of Islam would dis-
appear by itself. 
It was pointed out that both Iran and Algeria had liberal-democratic forces 
which failed to prevent the country falling, or almost falling, to Islamism. The 
perception was that, with an impotent democratic opposition that fails to win 
power, the same could happen in Azerbaijan. When people lose faith in both 
alive and the democratic opposition, both Islam and Communism may easily rise 
to the surface. Because both groups are so wellorganised, they are a danger; and 
it is not inconceivable that they may work together. 
One of the respondents voiced the fears of the others: ‘If you had talked to 
me only a year ago, I would have denied that Azerbaijan could develop into an 
Islamic theocracy, but developments are now strengthening the chances of Islam 
becoming an ideological platform. Progressive democrats like us find ourselves 
in a dilemma. People in the provinces haven’t a clue about democracy, but they 
do have a nostalgia for Islam. When I travelled in Dagestan in 1978–79, every-
one was a secular atheist, they were no more Islamist than we were. Everyone 
spoke Russian. But look what has happened in a short time. People are flocking 
to Islam. If our provincials become desperate enough, they will do the same. 
Baku is not the whole of Azerbaijan. In the countryside and in the small towns 
there is absolutely the potential for Islamism.’ 
Disappointment with Aliev will mean disillusion with Western oil compa-
nies, and so a turning-away from the West altogether. Moreover, Azerbaijanis 
generally perceive the West as supporting their fellow Christians in Armenia and 
blocking the membership of Muslim Turkey in the EU. For these reasons, says 
this school of thought among the respondents, the current pro-Westernism is a 
fragile flower. There are, in fact, voices calling for jihad to liberate Nagorno-
Karabakh; and so a Western refusal to help in a just settlement of this conflict 
will be a powerful catalyst for a mobilisation of the religious dimension of the 
conflict.  
Revolutions tend to break out in states with corrupt governance, where 
reforms have started but then bogged down. If the Azerbaijani dictatorship 
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becomes harsher, we cannot ignore the possibility of a revolution and an Islamic 
Republic. But, the interviewees added, the country’s special traditions mean that 
Azerbaijanis have nothing to fear, because their Islamic state will be a moderate 
one. To show that the country has a moderate form of Islamism, the respondents 
mentioned that the Islamist parties are now willing – in order to be legalised – to 
include a clause in their party constitutions accepting that Azerbaijan is a secular 
state. It was emphasised that because Azerbaijanis are more Europeanised and 
secular, an Islamic government will not result in Iranian or Algerian conditions. 
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Ethical Aspects of the Western Oil  
Industry’s Business Operations in 
Azerbaijan. The Respondents’ 
Prescriptive Analysis 
Democracy-building, human rights and corruption are political minefields in 
which the oil industry can, even with the best of intentions, put its feet wrong. 
Nevertheless, it is essential that Western industry takes a pro-active line in these 
areas. Its historical record leaves much to be desired and so it has a small margin 
of error; if, therefore, it wishes to enjoy a positive image in Western civil society 
and public opinion, it must clearly demonstrate a change of heart.  
This report is meant as a contribution to the debate over how the oil industry 
can in the best possible manner combine an ethical policy with good business in 
Azerbaijan. We asked the interviewees what the Western oil industry ought to be 
doing. Because the respondents belong to the political opposition, many of the 
answers may be tactically slanted. Others may be unrealistic, seen from the oil 
companies’ point of view. Even so, this does not detract from the relevance of 
what is being said by Azerbaijan’s main oppositional politicians, for it ouches on 
vital aspects of the companies’ ethical responsibility. 
‘Don’t be fooled by President Heidar Aliev’ 
A recurrent perception in the responses is that Western oil companies, and the 
West in general, fail to see what Aliev is really about. Like other dictators, they 
say, Aliev is a consummate opportunist, and turns his coat at the slightest pre-
text. This has enabled him to conceal the true face of the dictatorship. He fooled 
Brezhnev, and now he is fooling the West. He is leading the West up the garden 
path by echoing whatever it says, giving the impression of being for democracy 
and popular welfare and against corruption. In reality, however, all he is really 
interested in is himself and his own family. Aliev has combined the worst of all 
possible worlds – Communist dictatorship plus a capitalism without social con-
science. When he introduces Western laws and institutions, this is mere window-
dressing to buy goodwill in Western countries, they exist only on paper. He is 
now tightening the reins, and the contours of a personal dictatorship are getting 
ever clearer. An example of this, often mentioned, is his 1998 law on press free-
dom; what actually happened is that censorship is stronger than ever, media 
people are imprisoned, and not only they, but also their families, are subjected to 
arbitrary violence.  
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Aliev does not rule by the will of the people, and this is why he is seeking 
support both from bigger states and from the oil industry, claim the respondents. 
In the Soviet period, Russian leaders would visit Baku for talks in the same way 
as Western leaders do now. Then, he talked Communism to his guests , and now 
he talks democracy, equally without any benefit to the Azerbaijanis. The inter-
viewees are of the opinion that when Western oil companies maintain that they 
are not mixing business and politics, this is untrue, for it is thanks to the oil con-
tracts that Aliev is still in power. On ethical grounds the oil companies cannot 
continue to remain indifferent to this situation. 
Aliev and his cronies are greedy and lack any vestige of a social conscience. 
The interviewees emphasised that Azerbaijan is a Muslim country and that 
Aliev’s technique for holding power is therefore based on clan thinking. He is 
worried about what will happen to his family the day he dies or steps down. 
There are a lot of Azerbaijanis waiting to redress their grievances, and waiting 
for this very day for their revenge. 
It was also said that in a corrupt society like the Azerbaijani one, oil creates 
difficulties for the people and the country. There is a big black economy, it is 
well-known that Aliev’s family is involved in oil sales on the black market. As 
long as the Aliev mafia is on top, however, it will be impossible to do anything 
about it. The respondents therefore find it morally abhorrent that Western oil 
companies have such a lukewarm attitude to the whole problem.  
‘Don’t act as if the oil is Aliev’s to give away’ 
The artillery barrage from the respondents is targeted not only at Aliev, but also 
at Western oil companies. Only a tiny minority of the Azerbaijani population is 
prepared to praise the industry. Even if the companies pay lip service to demo-
cracy-building, respect for human rights and the struggle against corruption, they 
are indirectly and directly upholding the dictatorship.  
When Western oil companies come to Azerbaijan it is in order to earn as 
much money as possible, and to do that, you have to be on good terms with 
Aliev. Public relations are an optional extra. Several respondents regard the 
companies’ wish to earn money – even a lot of money – as legitimate in itself, 
but demand that they do so in accordance with ethical guidelines.  
The interviewees raise the question of lack of transparency and maintain that 
foreign oil investors are shocked at how much the regime can keep secret. Refu-
sal to publish can only serve as evidence of corruption. SOCAR, the Azerbaijani 
state oil company, spends money as it sees fit and no one gets to see its books. 
When buying equipment, it operates with prices four or five times above the real 
price, and the difference goes into private pockets. This secrecy is the very bed-
rock of the culture of corruption, and it is downright depressing that the Western 
oil companies are nurturing it. When Western investors know perfectly well that 
all the oil revenues go into the pockets of a small clique at the top and do noth-
ing about it, they are responsible for the phenomenon. Azerbaijan currently pro-
duces 10 million tonnes of oil: the population is convinced that Aliev skims 
most of the revenues, and if the country produced twice as much, all that would 
happen is that he would skim twice as much. 
The respondents point out that it is not Aliev who owns the oil, but the 
people. The Western companies seem to think that the oil is Aliev’s alone to 
give, and that they need to do business with and consider his interests alone. 
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‘Think in the long term – Aliev will not live forever’  
Western oil companies have only been in the country for five years, and so they 
are under the illusion that stability is due entirely to Aliev himself. For this rea-
son they want to keep in with him, fearing otherwise to lose their position. The 
interviewees regard this as short-term thinking. The idea that 30–40 years ahead 
it will be just as important for Western oil companies to have a stable society 
should induce them to rethink their policy and start forging other alliances. 
Investors should remember the role played by the Western oil companies under 
the Shah of Iran, and the tears in which that policy ended. Something similar is 
happening in Algeria and Libya, but the oil companies don’t seem to learn. Even 
if no violent revolution or Islamic state is provoked, at the very least a new gov-
ernment would look very carefully at the record of the oil companies and their 
support for the dictatorship, and not hesitate to cancel all existing contracts. 
Russia and Iran would be glad to take the Western companies’ place.  
The respondents maintained that dictatorship is not the same thing as, or any 
guarantee of, stability, and that stable and secure social conditions can only be 
created in democracies. Aliev’s ‘stability’ is purchased at the expense of human 
rights and democracy and the struggle against the spectre of corruption. Without 
saying a word in public, the Western oil companies make profitable deals with a 
president they know is against human rights. When this president, unlike those 
in many other parts of the world, is allowed to get away with it, the interviewees 
think they have the Western oil companies to thank.  
The respondents maintain that Western oil companies have on occasion gone 
much further in their adulation of Aliev than normal commercial considerations 
would dictate. There are funny stories about this: once the president of AOIC, 
Terry Adams, praised Aliev in such fulsome terms that even Aliev himself 
thought he had gone too far and asked him to tone it down a bit! On the same 
occasion Terry Adams presented a statue of the president. A spokesman from 
Chevron has admitted that in Angola the Western oil companies glorified the 
dictator in order to make him do what they wanted. The same sycophancy is 
seen in Azerbaijan, and makes people see corrupt interests.  
In short, everything the Western companies do seems calculated to convince 
the Azerbaijanis that a good relationship with Aliev personally is more impor-
tant than democracy. If the West continues this unconditional and uncritical sup-
port for Aliev, say the respondents, democracy will be a lost cause in Azerbai-
jan. Instead, the West and its oil industry must make it clear that they do not 
accept dictatorships.  
‘If Aliev pushes, call his bluff’ 
The respondents think they have detected a greater distance between the opposi-
tion and the oil companies after Aliev came to power. This confirms what reli-
able sources confirm, namely that the president has told the representatives of 
the oil companies that they ought not to talk to the political opposition.  
The interviewees describe how Aliev pressurises Western oil companies that 
have close contact with the opposition. However, their experience of 30 years of 
Aliev is that when he is pressured back, he yields. On several occasions the first 
American ambassador leant on Aliev, and won – no one is doing this now. West-
ern oil companies should therefore present a united front, but they never have: 
instead, they have walked on eggs around the dictator. The interviewees are 
forced to conclude that the Western oil companies want him to stay in power 
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indefinitely, and are therefore not interested in strengthening the democratic 
opposition; and that behind the companies are Western governments thinking 
along the same lines. The companies should be aware that even if Aliev loses an 
election, there will be no question of his stepping down; Azerbaijani elections 
are mere window-dressing, and international observers have yet to see how bad 
they are. Democratic elections would be respected only after very strong pres-
sure from the international community.  
Western oil companies are afraid that if they don’t do as the president wants, 
he will strike back and damage them in some way. However, the respondents 
maintain, as long as the companies have not obtained any unfair privileges, he 
can’t do anything to them. In fact, the reason why Aliev gives special rights to 
foreign investors is to use it later to put pressure on them. If the oil companies 
yield to such pressure, it proves that they have something on their conscience; 
contrariwise, if their hearts are pure they have nothing to fear.  
In the respondents’ opinion, the terror of the oil companies that Aliev may 
make it difficult for them to implement all their signed contracts, and prevent 
them obtaining new ones, is unjustified. For example, if Statoil decided to pres-
surise Aliev to be more transparent and democratic, it could be asked to leave 
the country. However, the oil contracts are approved by parliament and are thus 
the law of the land, Aliev can’t break them. The only time the companies have 
anything to fear is when the time comes to make new contracts. It is true that 
there is a danger that more cynical countries like Japan could exploit this situ-
ation by stepping in to replace companies that have fallen out with Aliev. If the 
Western countries are ethically responsible, however, they should take this 
calculated risk, all the more so if they present a common front. As for Russia, 
it’s out of the game. To begin with, the companies were dependent on Aliev, but 
now he is dependent on them.  
If, therefore, Western oil companies were to replot their course, cultivate the 
opposition, start protesting against violations of human rights and launch a cam-
paign for democracy, Aliev would be unable to do anything. Unlike other Mus-
lim countries, Azerbaijan has a strong and articulate opposition that would in 
that event support the oil companies. In addition comes the fact that democracy 
is the winning side globally. The oil companies, backed by the USA, have all the 
power they need to start emphasising ethics in business. 
Even though there was a great degree of consensus on the above, some re-
spondents took a different line as regards Western oil companies’ room for man-
oeuvre vis-à-vis Aliev. One respondent put it this way: ‘It is difficult to say how 
Aliev will react if Western companies had contacts with and supported the oppo-
sition. No one knows what’s going on in his head. He might yield and accept it, 
but it is more probable that he would ask the companies to leave the country, 
which would be a great loss to Azerbaijan. Aliev is a dangerous person.’ 
‘Talk to the opposition’ 
The interviewees pointed out that when Western oil companies failed to see that 
it was in their interest to fight for democracy and human rights and work against 
corruption, this was because these are areas dealt with primarily by local repre-
sentatives of the companies. However, the local managers of the Western oil 
companies in Azerbaijan have very short time horizons – five years, for 
example, before someone else takes over – and so in the short term it is their line 
of least resistance to keep in with Aliev. Short-termism will always lead to alli-
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ance with the sitting government, however dictatorial it may be. If the compa-
nies start thinking in the longer term, this will automatically lead to a greater 
emphasis on the moral aspects of their commercial operations. New manage-
ment methods will reward good business ethics, and perhaps even penalise those 
companies that have gone out of their way to run the dictatorship’s errands. It is 
vital, therefore, that someone at the top works out a human rights policy and for-
ces it through.  
The respondents who thought that the Western oil companies were doing 
nothing to promote democracy in Azerbaijan, said that the right thing to do 
would be to press their respective governments to pay more attention to support-
ing democratic forces in the country. The best in this area, they said, are the 
Americans. They get involved, and the Europeans should do the same. The 
respondents would like to see the oil companies, via their governments, support-
ing their demands for free and fair elections, the core of the democratic cause in 
Azerbaijan. If the leaders are unaccountable to the people, they won’t do any-
thing for them. As it is now, the only time Parliament has any influence, is when 
Aliev has not made up his own mind. At all other times, the deputies follow 
blindly, and thanks to comprehensive election fraud Aliev has always had full 
control. Should he lose a free and fair election, he could lose his grip on Parlia-
ment, it was said.  
A similar perception, shared by many of the interviewees, is that the oil com-
panies have not up to now had any positive effect on human rights either. With-
out human rights, there can be no democracy. The US State Department has 
commented on violations of human rights, but we hear nothing from the oil com-
panies. Not all the interviewees, however, shared this view. There were several 
who were glad to see that the Western oil companies now – in contrast to what 
went before – are showing a sense of moral responsibility with regard to demo-
cracy and human rights. Ethical thinking in this context is practically unknown 
to Azerbaijanis and so it important to show the way. All support from outside 
was welcome. The oil companies can put pressure on the regime through the 
latter’s signature on the international human rights conventions; the companies 
could monitor the protection of human rights and file periodical reports. These 
should be prepared by a new apparatus that they establish to keep track of what 
is going on in Azerbaijani society, independently of the government. Above all, 
the caution hitherto practised should be discarded. The companies should openly 
declare that they are adopting a new policy on human rights, and together with 
their governments they should not keep silence but speak out in public about 
Aliev’s massive daily contraventions. If the Western oil companies and their 
countries’ embassies did this, then Aliev would give way. He is not an unrecon-
structed Stalinist like Karimov in Uzbekistan.  
The respondents maintained that if the oil companies resumed the dialogue 
with the opposition, both sides would benefit; the companies would then have 
access to better information about Azerbaijan, especially information that Aliev 
tries to hide. The opposition should be invited to visit the companies’ home 
countries and put its case. As it is now, the oil companies seem to be treating the 
opposition – who after all are those who support democracy and strong ties with 
the West – as if they have the plague. 
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‘Support the free press’ 
The respondents asked why Western oil companies are not supporting the free 
press. They find it startling that the companies advertise exclusively in organs 
controlled by Aliev. The opposition paper Azadliq had to close for lack of adver-
tising revenue. The oil industry’s press policy is seen as a sign of partisanship. 
The only multinational that does not follow this sycophantic line is Coca-Cola, 
they advertise in all the newspapers. As well as oppositional newspapers, the 
interviewees consistently said that it was important that Western oil companies 
supported lawyers specialising in the media and free speech, so that they can 
afford to stay in operation and plead cases. They ought to support the press club 
in which the opposition holds press conferences open to all papers, and support 
the newspaper’s library service. The same applies to television companies; some 
of the apparently ‘private’ channels are secretly controlled by Aliev, but Western 
investors could help the Azerbaijanis to found a new television channel that 
really is independent. 
‘Help to develop civil society’ 
Other contributions to the development of a civil society are within the power of 
the oil companies, for example financial support to NGOs engaged in human 
rights. This is actually quite legal even under Aliev’s rule. While a few of the 
interviewees thought that Western investors would never accept a programme 
for human rights and maintained that ‘we don’t really want them to, they are 
here to do business’, the others saw it as essential that the Western oil companies 
make a serious effort to school Azerbaijanis in democracy and human rights. 
They should support seminars teaching these subjects, seminars aimed at teach-
ers, the young people in refugee camps and police cadets. Important generally 
was support for science and culture, student exchanges, technology transfers and 
development of local oil expertise. 
Another important measure was to support trade unions and stop signing con-
tracts that explicitly restricted labour rights. Yet other areas were minority 
groups, health care and women in the oil industry. Courses could be held for the 
deputies of the national assembly; these never meet the ordinary people, they 
have no notion of responsibility to constituents, and never speak about human 
rights.  
If the West is serious about creating stability in the region – what has been 
called the Silk Road Project – its task may be summarised in two words: support 
democracy! 
‘Open the books’ 
The interviewees have expectations of the oil, which they thought ought to cre-
ate a basis for prosperity and give them political advantages. Western oil compa-
nies, that are professional in their operations and business relations, bring money 
to the country. On the other hand, it was said, you must not imagine that Azer-
baijan is Kuwait – and it never will be. If we are to get rich, a lot of hard work is 
needed. We won’t become an oil nation in the traditional sense; oil will become 
a smaller but important part of our economy, it ought not to be the engine of 
economic development. The fact that oil has caused only trouble is connected to 
the fact that the country lacks petroleum legislation and strategy. 
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One respondent said: ‘A few years ago someone wrote in a article that the 
question was whether Azerbaijan would become another Norway or another 
Nigeria. It looks like the answer is Nigeria – dictatorship, police state, unem-
ployment and corruption. Ordinary people haven’t seen a cent of the contracts 
with the oil companies, and no one knows where the money has gone. Western 
oil companies must help stop Azerbaijan turning into a Nigeria – and they can, if 
they have the courage to speak out and speak up.’ Other respondents didn’t like 
the comparison with Nigeria. We are not like the Nigerians, they said, we are 
much more advanced, and we won’t take the same road. There were some simi-
larities, it was true, but differences as well: for example a free press, active poli-
tical parties and in future there would be free and fair elections. One of the inter-
viewees was even more optimistic, and that was why he was staying in the 
country; for, as he said, one day there would be a new situation when Aliev was 
no longer in power. 
After five years, people are asking whether the money spent on SOCAR has 
been worth it, or whether it has all ended up in foreign bank accounts. We don’t 
know where the money from the early oil went, and it seems as if corruption is 
deterring further investment. We expected that when the big fish (the oil compa-
nies) came, the small fish would follow, but that has not happened, everything 
seems to have seized up. For this reason the Western oil companies must start 
publishing the figures of what they transfer to SOCAR. As long as SOCAR is 
not a public company, it can be secretive, and the corruption problem will never 
be solved. It must be pressured to publish its transactions. The Western compa-
nies must tell us how much they are paying for various services, for example for 
data from the Geological Institute. The same goes for the bonuses they pay for 
contracts. In the same way, the planned Azerbaijani Petroleum Fund must be 
controlled by democratic institutions, or else it will be just another weapon in the 
arsenal of the corrupt regime. Western oil companies must make sure that the 
intentions of the Fund are kept in mind and followed up. If they are, this will 
lead to more open politics and less corruption. In a word, all payments must be 
public. The Western oil companies could start doing this tomorrow, but they are 
afraid of Aliev’s reaction.  
‘Publish the plans’ 
If investors start demanding access to accounts, contracts and asset flows on the 
Azerbaijani side, and themselves allow public inspection, this will go a long way 
to eliminating corruption. Moreover, they should publish all their plans and pro-
jects, not in the state-controlled press, but in their own publications, which they 
could then circulate to the opposition. That will stop politicians saying after-
wards that ‘they didn’t know’. Conferences for the opposition in which the com-
panies talk about their plans will also be useful.  
‘Stop paying bribes’ 
The respondents emphasised that the oil companies must stop sucking up to 
Aliev and instead tell him loud and clear that there must be an end to his crook-
ery. Economic aid must be given not to the government but to private companies 
and institutions. Western oil companies must stop allying themselves with Aliev, 
they must stop paying bribes, and they must talk openly about corruption and 
blow the whistle on the money that Aliev is pocketing.  
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The respondents called for joint conferences with the opposition and NGOs 
to which independent experts on corruption are invited. There could be ‘think 
tanks’ for corruption and economic development – for example, there was rec-
ently a corruption conference held by the American Chamber of Commerce and 
Bagirov, a member of the Musavat party and president of the Far Centre; the 
contributions will be published and distributed. 
‘Support us in Nagorno-Karabakh’ 
The interviewees argued that oil and politics must not be seen as two separate 
spheres, because that would push the struggle for Nagorno-Karabakh into the 
background. They thought that young people would not fight for Nagorno-
Karabakh because they think that it would prevent them enjoying the good life 
that they expect if oil production proceeds in peace and quiet.  
The respondents maintain that Aliev’s promises that the oil companies would 
support Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh have not been fulfilled. On the con-
trary, it is asserted, the oil companies are exploiting the difficult situation. First 
Russia kept the conflict going to oppress us, and now the West is doing the 
same. Neither the USA nor NATO has supported us. The situation is now remi-
niscent of the cold war, with Russia on the one side and America on the other. 
Not even Norway, which does not have the same geopolitical interests as the 
Powers, can see the conflict objectively. Nagorno-Karabakh can become the 
next Kosovo.  
The disappointment over the Western attitudes to Nagorno-Karabakh can 
cause future governments to give the oil contracts to the Japanese and Chinese 
instead. For Azerbaijan, giving the contracts to Western companies was a politi-
cal choice, but the West saw it as a market response and took it for granted.  
The odd thing is that Armenia is now using the oil argument to maintain the 
hopeless situation in Nagorno-Karabakh: the Armenians are saying that the oil 
will make the Azerbaijanis more powerful, and so they need Western support to 
compensate. As the respondents see it, the West cares about the Armenians but 
not about the Azerbaijanis. There is a double standard, which is not compatible 
with human rights thinking; the same rules should apply to all irrespective of 
ethnicity. Western oil companies should put pressure on their governments, and 
support us in Nagorno-Karabakh and against Russia. If they do that, we will love 
them.  
 
Appendix I 
Interview schedule for field research in Baku, 
September/October 1999 
Name of interviewee 
Part I  Questions about the Western oil industry 
1 What do you think are the most important aspects of the oil industry in Azer-
baijan? Please list only three aspects and in order of importance. 
2 What might lead to a worsening and what to an improvement of relations 
between the oil industry and the political opposition?  
3 If the oil industry were to develop more intimate and friendlier relations with 
the opposition, then what do you think would happen? 
Part II  Questions about Statoil and Norway 
1 What do you think about the Norwegian oil company Statoil compared to the 
other Western oil companies?  
Is it  Much the same  Different Very different 
If you think it is different, could you in a more detailed way describe how it 
is different? 
2 How do you think the Western oil industry affects the struggle for democratic 
development and human rights in Azerbaijan? 
 Has it No effect  Negative effect  Positive effect 
If affected, could you in a more detailed way describe how it is affected? 
Could you cite some examples? 
If the Western oil industry wants to be more helpful in your struggle for 
democratic development and human rights, do you have any suggestions for 
what they could do?  
3 How do you think the Western oil industry affects the serious corruption pro-
blem in Azerbaijan? 
 Has it No effect  Negative effect  Positive effect 
If there is an effect, could you in a more detailed way describe how it is 
affected?  
Could you cite some examples? 
If the Western oil industry wants to be more helpful in reducing the level of 
corruption, do you have any suggestions for what they could do? 
Part III  Questions about Azerbaijani identity 
If you should rank what I would call these competing identities, how would you 
rank them when describing your own identity? 
Azerbaijani …………… 
Azerbaijani Turk, Lezgian Talish, Tat, Kurd …………… 
Muslim …………… 
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Part IV  Questions about recent developments 
Here we only presented themes for discussion with no standardised questions. 
• Political Islam (in Azerbaijan) 
• Destabilisation of Azerbaijan  
• Terrorism against the oil industry in Azerbaijan 
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Appendix II 
List of interviewees  
Politicians  
 
1. Isa Qambar, Chairman of the Musavat Party, Former Speaker of Parlia-
ment, Right-wing politician, espouses some liberal and some nationalis-
tic ideas. Historian, former Research Fellow at the Institute of Oriental 
Studies. Ethnic origin: Azerbaijani Turk  
 
2. Abulfaz Elchibey, Chairman of the Popular Front of Azerbaijan. For-
mer President. Calls himself a right-wing politician, Turkic nationalist. 
Historian (Oriental Studies), former Senior Research Fellow at the Insti-
tute of Manuscripts, Academy of Science. Ethnic origin: Azerbaijani 
Turk  
 
3. Ali Kerimov, First Deputy Chairman of the Popular Front. Right-wing 
politician, espouses some liberal and some nationalistic ideas. Leader of 
informal ‘Yurd’ organisation, Member of Parliament. Education: Law. 
Ethnic origin: Azerbaijani Turk  
 
4. Muzaffar Djabrayil-zadeh, Chairman of the Islam Party (pro-Iranian, 
in favour of Islamic Republic)  
 
5. Leyla Yunusova, Chairman of the Peace and Democracy Institute. One 
of the founders of the Popular Front, former Chief of National Army 
Information Service (in Elchibey’s time). Ethnic origin: Azerbaijani 
Turk  
 
6. Ilyas Ismailov, Co-Chairman of the Democratic Party (shares this posi-
tion with Rasul Quliyev, now in asylum in the USA). Calls himself a 
democrat and an adherent of ‘common sense’. Vague political views. 
Former Prosecutor-General (during the later Soviet years) and former 
Minister of Justice (in Elchibey’s time). Education: Law. Ethnic origin: 
Azerbaijani Turk  
 
7. Zardusht Alizadeh, Co-Chairman of the Social Democratic Party 
(shares this position with his brother Araz Alizadeh). One of the found-
ers of the Popular Front Movement, later founded the SDP. Education: 
Oriental Studies. Advocates good relations with Iran and Russia. 
Against Pan-Turkism, in favour of Mutallibov. Ethnic origin: unknown, 
calls himself an Azerbaijani  
 
8. Nazim Imanov, Deputy Chairman of the National Independence Party, 
Member of Parliament, Doctor of Economics. Right-wing politician, 
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liberal-minded, in favour of free market model. Ethnic origin: Azerbai-
jani Turk  
 
9. Dr Firidun Jalilov, Speaker of the Assembly, National Independence 
Party, former Minister of Education (in Elchibey’s time). Strong Turkic 
nationalist. Ethnic origin: Azerbaijani Turk 
 
10. Tahir Kerimly, Chairman of the Vahdat (Unity) Party, former Chief 
Justice (in Elchibey’s time). Education: Law. Calls himself a democrat, 
not in favour of Pan-Turkism. Ethnic origin: Azerbaijani Turk  
 
11. Etibar Mamedov, Chairman of the National Independence Party, Mem-
ber of Parliament. Historian. Right-wing politician, strong nationalist, in 
favour of ‘order and stability’. Ethnic origin: Azerbaijani Turk  
 
12. Sabit Bagirov, President of the Far Centre research institution. One of 
the founders of the Popular Front, former Chairman of the State Oil 
Company (in Elchibey’s time). Member of the Musavat Party. Econo-
mist, liberal-minded. In favour of the Baku-Iran-Turkey pipeline. Ethnic 
origin: Azerbaijani Turk  
 
13. Panah Husseynof, Chairman of the People’s Party, former Prime Min-
ister (in Elchibey’s time), one of the Founders of the Popular Front. His-
torian. Espouses liberal, nationalistic, social-democratic and populist 
ideas. Ethnic origin: Azerbaijani Turk  
 
14. Ramiz Axmedov, Chairman of the Azerbaijan Communist Party, philo-
logist, journalist, First Secretary of the Communist Party in the Gabala 
and Evlakh regions under the USSR. Former Editor-in-Chief of the 
Communist Newspaper (main governmental paper in the former USSR). 
Pro-Russian and anti-Western. Has good links with the Russian Com-
munist Party. Ethnic origin: unknown  
Intellectuals, NGIs and Mass Media Magnates 
 
15. Dr Hasan Guliyev, Chief Analyst, Turan Information Agency, Doctor 
of Philosophy, liberal-minded. Ethnic origin: Azerbaijani Turk 
 
16. Rauf Arifoglu, Editor in Chief of the most popular newspaper in Azer-
baijan, Turkic nationalist. Ethnic origin: Azerbaijani Turk  
 
17. Hadjy Azer Samedov, Chairman of the Independent ‘Islam Ittihad’ 
religious community. Moderate Shi’i Islamist, in favour of good Azer-
baijani–Iranian relations. Ethnic origin: Azerbaijani Turk  
 
18. Rauf Talishinski, Editor in Chief of ‘Zerkalo’, the most popular 
Russian-language newspaper in Azerbaijan. Liberal-minded. Ethnic ori-
gin: unknown  
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19. Vagif Sefikhanov, Professor at Baku State University, CEO of RISK 
Computer Software Company. Liberal-minded. Ethnic Origin: Azerbai-
jani Turk  
 
20. Hikmet Hadjy-zadeh, Vice-President of the Far Centre research institu-
tion, Member of the Board and Head of the Analytical Department of 
the Musavat Party. Liberal-minded. Ethnic origin: Azerbaijani Turk  
 

Abstract 
This is a study of the Azerbaijani political elite’s perceptions of Western oil 
companies and their contribution to – or hindrance of – the development of 
democracy and human rights. Twenty oppositional figures, including most of the 
party leaders and presidential candidates, plus some media, NGO and academic 
personalities, were subjected to an in-depth interview.  
There was a consensus that the Western oil industry was at best irrelevant 
and at worst inimical to the cause of democracy and human rights in Azerbaijan. 
This is because short-term commercial considerations have led it to kowtow to 
the dictatorship, ignore the political opposition and boycott the free media. 
There is also pay discrimination against Azerbaijani labour. Above all, it was 
almost universally agreed that the Western oil industry is aggravating the cor-
ruption of Azerbaijani life. Nobody thought Statoil worse than the other foreign 
oil companies, but only a minority thought it better.  
The result of this undesirable behaviour is likely to be the severe displeasure 
of any new government based on the current political opposition, which may 
prefer Japanese and Chinese investment. At worst, the population’s acute 
disillusionment with the West and the social misery caused by corruption and 
mismanagement may override Azerbaijan’s secular and moderate traditions and 
bring about an Islamic Republic. 
The elite makes many suggestions for what the Western oil companies can 
and should do to improve the situation: such as not being bluffed by the presi-
dent, insisting on transparent accounting, cultivating alternative centres of 
power, facilitating scientific, educational and cultural exchange and supporting 
the Azerbaijani cause in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 
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